

EXHIBIT 63

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10
11 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
12 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
13
14 WESTERN DIVISION

15 **STEVEN RUPP; STEVEN
16 DEMBER; CHERYL JOHNSON;
MICHAEL JONES;
17 CHRISTOPHER SEIFERT;
ALFONSO VALENCIA; TROY
WILLIS; and CALIFORNIA RIFLE
18 & PISTOL ASSOCIATION,
INCORPORATED,**

19 Plaintiffs,

20 v.

21 **ROB BONTA, in his official capacity
22 as Attorney General of the State of
California; and DOES 1-10,**

23 Defendants.

24
25 8:17-cv-00746-JLS-JDE

**SUPPLEMENTAL EXPERT
REPORT AND DECLARATION
OF MICHAEL VORENBERG**

Courtroom: 8A
Judge: The Honorable Josephine
L. Staton

Action Filed: April 24, 2017

26 ¹ Rob Bonta has succeeded former Attorney General Xavier Becerra as the
27 Attorney General of the State of California. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 25(d), Attorney General Bonta, in his official capacity, is substituted as
28 the defendant in this case.

SUPPLEMENTAL EXPERT REPORT AND DECLARATION OF MICHAEL VORENBERG

I, Michael Vorenberg, declare under penalty of perjury that the following is true and correct:

1. I have been asked by the Office of the Attorney General of the California Department of Justice to prepare an expert report on the existence, usage, and regulation of high-capacity firearms (guns capable of firing more than 10 rounds without re-loading) during Reconstruction. This supplemental expert report and declaration (“Report”) is based on my own personal knowledge and experience, and, if I am called as a witness, I could and would testify competently to the truth of the matters discussed in this Report.

PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS

2. I am an associate professor of history at Brown University. I received my A.B. from Harvard University in 1986, and my Ph.D. in history from Harvard in 1995. After receiving my Ph.D., I began a postdoctoral fellowship at the W.E.B. Du Bois Institute at Harvard, and then served as an assistant professor of History at the State University of New York at Buffalo. I joined the faculty at Brown University in 1999, and have taught history there ever since.

3. I have concentrated my research on the history of the U.S. Civil War and Reconstruction. My first book, *Final Freedom: The Civil War, the Abolition of Slavery, and the Thirteenth Amendment*, was published by Cambridge University Press in 2001. The book was a Finalist for the Gilder Lehrman Lincoln Prize. I am also the author of *The Emancipation Proclamation: A Brief History with Documents*, published by Bedford/St. Martin's in 2010. I am the author of a number of articles and essays on Reconstruction and the law. These include: "The 1866 Civil Rights Act and the Beginning of Military Reconstruction," in Christian Samito, ed., *The Greatest and the Grandest Act: The Civil Rights Act of 1866 from Reconstruction to Today* (Southern Illinois University Press, 2018); Citizenship and

1 the Thirteenth Amendment: Understanding the Deafening Silence,” in Alexander
2 Tsesis, ed., *The Promises of Liberty: The History and Contemporary Relevance of*
3 *the Thirteenth Amendment* (Columbia University Press, 2010); “Reconstruction as a
4 Constitutional Crisis,” in Thomas J. Brown, ed., *Reconstructions: New Directions*
5 *in the History of Postbellum America* (Oxford University Press, 2006); and
6 “Imagining a Different Reconstruction Constitution,” *Civil War History*, 51 (Dec.
7 2005), 416-26.

8 4. My curriculum vitae is attached as **Exhibit A**.

9 5. I have been retained by the California Department of Justice to serve
10 as an expert witness in this case. I am being compensated at a rate of \$250 per
11 hour.

12 6. I have provided expert testimony in *Miller v. Bonta*, a lawsuit in the
13 Southern District of California (Case No. 3:19-cv-01537-BEN-JLB) challenging
14 how California regulates assault weapons; *Duncan v. Bonta*, a lawsuit in the
15 Southern District of California (Case No. 17-cv-01017-BEN-JLB) challenging how
16 California regulates large-capacity magazines; *Ocean State Tactical LLC v. Rhode*
17 *Island*, a lawsuit in the District of Rhode Island (Case No. 1:22-cv-246-JJM-PAS)
18 challenging that state’s regulation of large-capacity magazines; *Oregon Firearms*
19 *Federation, Inc. v. Brown*, a lawsuit in the District of Oregon (Case No. 2:22-cv-
20 01815-IM) challenging that state’s regulation of large-capacity magazines; and
21 *National Association for Gun Rights, et al. v. City of Naperville, Ill.*, a lawsuit in
22 the Northern District of Illinois (Case No. 1:22-cv-04775) challenging the City of
23 Naperville’s regulation of semi-automatic rifles.

24 **OPINIONS**

25 **I. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS**

26 7. This Report provides results of an investigation into the existence,
27 usage, and regulation of high-capacity firearms (guns capable of firing more than
28 10 rounds without re-loading) during the Reconstruction period of U.S. History

1 (1863-1877), with special focus on the period during Reconstruction when the
2 Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was created, ratified, and enforced
3 (1866-1876). The result of the investigation can be summarized as follows: There
4 were high-capacity firearms during Reconstruction, and all of them, including those
5 that could easily be carried by a single individual, were regarded in all the states at
6 the time as weapons suitable only for law enforcement officers, not for ordinary
7 citizens. With very few exceptions, almost all of which were in the Western
8 Territories, high-capacity firearms during the era were understood to be weapons of
9 war or anti-insurrection, not weapons of individual self-defense.

10 8. Evidence for these assertions does not necessarily take the form of
11 statutes or court decisions, and that is entirely unsurprising: explicit legal text
12 prohibiting civilian possession of the most dangerous weapons of war was not
13 commonly the means by which such weapons were regulated in the United States
14 during the Civil War and Reconstruction.² Rather, prohibitions existed in the
15 policies and practices of the U.S. army and its auxiliary or allied units, such as the
16 state-wide militias that operated as law enforcement bodies during Reconstruction.
17 No statutes or court opinions can be found during the period that banned civilian
18 possession of artillery pieces, hundreds of which existed unused after the Civil War,
19 but of course the absence of such express prohibitions cannot be read as evidence
20 that civilians were allowed to possess such pieces. Rather, policy and practice
21 dictated that only the U.S. army and its allied military units could possess such
22 weapons. High-capacity firearms, which like artillery pieces were created as
23 weapons of war, were regulated in the same way, through policy and practice
24 limiting possession of such firearms to the U.S. army and its allied military units.
25 Unlike artillery pieces, however, high-capacity firearms during Reconstruction did
26

27 2 In contrast, state and local laws did regulate other types of weapons, such as
28 concealable weapons associated with criminal use, during this period.

1 come to be regarded by their manufacturers as having a potential market among
2 U.S. civilians.

3 9. However, efforts to create a market for high-capacity firearms in the
4 United States during Reconstruction failed miserably. Americans who were not
5 part of legal law enforcement bodies rarely bought high-capacity firearms. One
6 reason why these firearms failed to sell was the regulatory climate surrounding
7 them. U.S. and pro-Union state authorities sometimes seized shipments of such
8 weapons on the assumption that they were intended for use by insurrectionary
9 groups. Because of the negligible demand for such weapons, owners of gun shops
10 rarely stocked them. The primary, almost exclusive buyers of high-capacity
11 weapons during Reconstruction were a small number of U.S. army units and state
12 law enforcement bodies. Manufacturers of high-capacity firearms during
13 Reconstruction thus looked outside the United States for buyers. The Winchester
14 Repeating Rifle Company, the only company to produce such weapons during post-
15 Civil War Reconstruction, stayed afloat during Reconstruction only by selling high-
16 capacity firearms to foreign armies.

17 10. During Reconstruction, high-capacity firearms did not circulate widely
18 among the civilian population; thus there was no need for legislative efforts to
19 regulate them among civilians. Instead, during Reconstruction, high-capacity
20 firearms were possessed almost exclusively by the U.S. army and related military
21 units, and they were regulated by the policies and practices of the army and these
22 related military units.

23 **II. SCOPE**

24 **A. Time Period Covered**

25 11. The time period covered by this Report is Reconstruction, typically
26 defined as 1863-1877. This is the time period assigned to Reconstruction in the
27
28

most commonly used study of the period, Eric Foner's *Reconstruction*.³ The start point of 1863 correlates to the Emancipation Proclamation, the final version of which was signed by President Abraham Lincoln on January 1, 1863. The endpoint correlates to March 1877, when a new president, the Republican Rutherford B. Hayes, was inaugurated after a months-long contested election; and Hayes, once in office, oversaw the removal of all remaining U.S. troops in southern states that had been part of the Confederate States of America, the rebellious entity that had fought the United States during the Civil War of 1861-1865. Within the general period of Reconstruction, the more narrow time period examined in this Report is 1866-1876. This is the period covering events relevant to the relationship between the Fourteenth Amendment and firearms during the greater period of Reconstruction. Such events include (in chronological order): the passage by the U.S. Congress of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the new Freedman's Bureau Act (the initial Freedman's Bureau Act, passed in March 1865, was for one year only); the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment by Congress in 1866; the passage by Congress of the Reconstruction Act of 1867 (sometimes referred to as the "Military Reconstruction Act"); the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment by state ratification in 1868; the enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment by U.S. Statutes adopted in 1870-71; and the first interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's relation to the Second Amendment by the U.S. Supreme Court, in *U.S. v. Cruikshank* of 1876 (92 U.S. 542). This Report also mentions the opinion in *Presser v. Illinois* (116 U.S. 252 (1886)), even though it came well after Reconstruction, because the events that led to the case occurred in early 1879, very soon after the end of Reconstruction.

1 **B. Geographical Focus**

2 12. This Report covers the geographic area of the entire United States,
3 both its states and territories, during Reconstruction. However, its particular
4 regional focus is on the southern states that had declared themselves seceded in
5 1860-61 and had joined together into the Confederacy by April 1861. These states
6 collectively represented the region during 1866-1876 where there was the most
7 frequent use of firearms, mainly because of armed conflict either between
8 contending factions within these states or between the U.S. army and insurgents in
9 these states. Even more specifically, this was the only region outside of the
10 Western Territories where Henry Rifles and Winchester Repeating Rifles were
11 used. As will be explained later, these are the weapons examined most closely in
12 this Report (see IV. Historical Background and Terminology). In the Western
13 Territories during Reconstruction, these weapons were used primarily by the U.S.
14 army against Native Americans in the so-called “Indian Wars” that extended from
15 the 1860s to the 1890s. Some civilian U.S. citizens in the Western Territories
16 during this period also possessed these weapons. However, as with all firearms in
17 the region at the time, it is difficult to determine how common possession of Henry
18 Rifles and Winchester Repeating Rifles was in the Western Territories in the
19 Reconstruction period. Also, laws in these territories in this period were in flux, so
20 it is difficult to know whether possession by civilian U.S. citizens there was lawful.
21 Whatever the laws were at any given moment in this region during Reconstruction,
22 the number of non-army U.S. citizens in the Western Territories was always
23 negligible.

24 **III. RESEARCH MATERIALS AND METHODOLOGY**

25 13. Research materials included standard scholarly works on firearms and
26 U.S. history for the period of Reconstruction—roughly twenty scholarly books and
27 thirty scholarly articles. Materials also included newspaper and magazine articles
28 contemporary to the period studied. Hundreds of these are accessible and were

1 accessed via commonly used databases by scholars, such as Chronicling America,
2 Pro-Quest Historical Newspapers, and the Hathi Trust. U.S. government
3 documents and documents from U.S. states and territories were accessed via the
4 Hein Online database or the Nexis Uni database (a version of the better-known
5 Lexis Nexis legal database).

6 14. All of these documents, whether contemporary to the period studied or
7 produced by scholars after that period, were searched for information regarding
8 firearms—especially Henry Rifles and Winchester Repeating Rifles—with special
9 attention to the presence, use, and regulation of these firearms during the
10 Reconstruction era (1863-1877).

11 15. In all my research, I gave more weight to evidence that attested to
12 firearms being owned and/or used than to evidence that manufacturers of the
13 firearms or other sellers were trying to get people to buy and use them.
14 Advertisements for the firearms are not evidence of possession. However, if
15 advertising material provided testimony of the firearms being owned or used, I
16 treated that testimony as legitimate evidence, albeit evidence that might have been
17 embellished, even invented, for the sake of sales.

18 **IV. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND TERMINOLOGY**

19 **A. Firearm Capacity at or Near the Founding**

20 16. Weapons capable of holding more than ten rounds did exist by the
21 time that the Second Amendment was adopted in 1791, but only in very small
22 numbers, and almost exclusively in Europe. Those that might have existed in the
23 U.S. at the time were made to order by individual gunsmiths for individual
24 customers. These bespoke weapons were extraordinarily rare in the United States
25 surrounding the period of the adoption of the Second Amendment.

26 17. One of these rare guns was the “Cookson” or “Hill” model, based on
27 the “Lorenzoni system” established in Europe in the 1600s. Only one gun of this
28 type definitively existed in early America; it was an 11-shot rifle mentioned in an

1 account of 1722 from Boston. Even if others of this type existed in British North
2 America, they would not have been well known. According to one expert, the
3 slightest defect in these weapons would lead to an explosion, so they required
4 perfect construction by “fine craftsmen.” Thus, only “wealthy sportsmen” could
5 afford them.

6 18. Another rare high-capacity gun of the era was the Girardoni (or
7 Girandoni) air rifle, which could hold at least 20 rounds. The Girardoni was
8 manufactured exclusively in Europe. Most of the guns manufactured were custom-
9 ordered in the late 1700s by the Austrian army, which used the weapons with some
10 success. To maintain a military advantage, the Austrians demanded that the guns
11 be manufactured in secret.⁴ No Girardoni is known to have appeared in America
12 prior to 1800. There were about 30-40 guns on the Lewis and Clark expedition of
13 1804-1806, including a single Girardoni. Expedition leaders used it not for self-
14 defense or hunting but for one purpose only: to impress Native Americans with
15 white Americans’ advanced technology.⁵ Its presence on the expedition is not
16 evidence that the gun was well-known to Americans of the period, much less to
17 Americans at the time of the Second Amendment’s adoption more than ten years
18 earlier

19 **B. The Henry Rifle and the Winchester Repeating Rifle**

20 19. For the purposes of this Report, a high-capacity firearm is defined as a
21 firearm that can hold more than 10 rounds. The magazine holding the rounds can
22 either be integral to the gun or external to it. The gun itself can be carried by a
23 single person. Finally, the gun must have the potential for common usage: it has to

24 ⁴ W. H. B. Smith, *Gas, Air and Spring Guns of the World* (Harrisburg, Penn.:
25 Military Service Publishing Company, 1957). 30.

26 ⁵ Jim Garry, *Weapons of the Lewis and Clark Expedition* (Norman, Okla.:
27 Arthur H. Clark, 2012), 94; S. K. Wier, “The Firearms of the Lewis and Clark
Expedition” (2010),
28 http://www.westernexplorers.us/Firearms_of_Lewis_and_Clark.pdf (accessed Nov.
7, 2022).

1 be mass-manufactured or have the potential to be mass-manufactured, thus
2 excluding experimental weapons that were never widely adopted.

3 20. Within these specifications, there were only two high-capacity
4 firearms in the entire world that were produced during Reconstruction: the Henry
5 Rifle and the Winchester Repeating Rifle. I note the exclusion here of the Gatling
6 Gun. That weapon was indeed a high-capacity firearm produced during
7 Reconstruction, but it could not be carried by a single person, as it was massive in
8 size and nearly 200 pounds in weight.

9 21. The Henry Rifle and the Winchester Repeating Rifle were nearly the
10 same weapon. Manufacturing of the Henry began soon after the weapon was
11 patented, in 1860. In 1866, the Winchester Repeating Rifle was established in New
12 Haven, Connecticut. Its owner, Oliver Winchester, hired the inventor of the Henry,
13 who designed a slightly modified version of the Henry Rifle. The new model was
14 dubbed a Winchester Repeating Model. Because it was released in 1866, it was
15 sometimes called the “Winchester 66.” In 1873, a new model of Winchester was
16 released, the “Winchester 73.” The rifle was nearly the same as the “Winchester
17 66” but used a slightly different type of ammunition. All of these rifles, the Henry
18 and the two models of the Winchester, had the following features: they held fifteen
19 rounds in a chamber fixed within a stock just below the rifle barrel; they used a
20 lever below the trigger to eject spent shells and load new rounds; and they were
21 easily reloaded. The Winchester was easier to reload than the Henry—it had a
22 “gate” on the side near the trigger that allowed the user to feed rounds into the gun
23 during lulls in firing or after all the rounds in the chamber were spent).
24 Advertisements for Henrys and Winchesters claimed that the weapons could fire
25 two rounds per second (this rate might have been exaggerated—some of the same
26 ads made the false claim that the guns held eighteen rounds, not fifteen—but all
27 agreed that the rifle could fire at a rate at least as fast as any existing rifle).

28

1 22. There were other individual-use weapons during the Reconstruction
2 era that could fire multiple shots in rapid sequence, but none had a higher capacity
3 than ten rounds. Some sidearms, most notably six-shot revolvers, could fire rounds
4 in rapid sequence. But no sidearm held more than ten rounds. Certain rifles beside
5 the Henry and Winchester could fire multiple rounds rapidly, but none held more
6 than ten rounds. These included the Spencer Rifle (4-round capacity) and the
7 Sharps Rifle (7-round capacity). The U.S. army and the Confederate army
8 approved the adoption of the Spencer and Sharps rifles. These weapons were
9 known either by their company name or by the generic term “repeaters” or
10 “repeating rifles.” Henrys and Winchesters were also repeating rifles, but because
11 they were in a class of their own, due to their high capacity, they were generally
12 known only as Henrys or as Winchesters. In the language of the day, they did not
13 fall into the generic category of “repeaters” or “repeating rifles” (thus a very well-
14 armed individual of the period might be described as having “a revolver, a repeater,
15 and a Winchester”—three distinct categories).

16 23. This Report occasionally uses the term “Henry-Winchester.”
17 Although the Winchester Repeating Rifle effectively replaced the Henry Rifle,
18 Henry Rifles continued to be used long after Winchesters began to be produced. At
19 certain times and places during Reconstruction, both types of weapons might be
20 found in possession of a single, armed group. For such situations, the phrase
21 “Henry Rifles and/or Winchester Repeating Rifles” would be appropriate, but
22 seeing how cumbersome that phrase is, it has been shortened in this Report to
23 “Henry-Winchester” or “Henry-Winchesters.”

24 **C. The Henry Rifle and the American Civil War**

25 24. Production and sales numbers reveal that Henry Rifles and their
26 successors, Winchester Repeating Rifles, were uncommon during the Civil War and

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1 Reconstruction compared to other rifles.⁶ Until 1866, manufacturers of Henrys and
2 Winchesters concentrated their marketing efforts within the United States on trying
3 to persuade the U.S. army and pro-Union state militias to adopt the high-capacity
4 rifles as standard weapons for soldiers.⁷ The U.S. War Department never adopted
5 Henry-Winchesters. The army's chief of ordnance, General James Ripley, reported
6 early in the war that these rifles, along with lower-capacity rifles were "too
7 complicated, too heavy, and too costly . . . and apt to waste ammunition."⁸ The
8 ordinance department never changed its position on Henry-Winchesters. During
9 the Civil War, the U.S. army opted instead for single-shot rifles and, in some
10 instances, low-capacity "repeaters" (rifles that held magazines of two to seven
11 rounds). The U.S. army did allow individual commanders of army units or allied
12 units to buy Henry-Winchesters for their soldiers. For example, of the 900 Henry
13 rifles sold during 1862, 300 went to Kentucky's pro-Union state militia.⁹ Although
14 some military units that purchased Henry Rifles were able to do so using funds
15 allotted to them by state governments, most of the soldiers and officers who
16 purchased the weapons used their own money. By the end of the Civil War in
17 1865, U.S. soldiers had purchased about 8,500 Henry Rifles; most of those had
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21 ⁶ Unless otherwise noted, this Report relies on two sources for numbers of
22 Henry Rifles and Winchester Repeating Rifles manufactured and sold: Pamela
23 Haag, *The Gunning of America: Business and the Making of American Gun Culture*
(New York: Basic Books, 2016); and John E. Parsons, *The First Winchester: The
Story of the 1866 Repeating Rifle* (New York: Morrow, 1955).

24 ⁷ Haag, *The Gunning of America*, 65-81. During the Civil War, the pro-
25 Union border states of Kentucky and Missouri had state-wide militias that were
26 authorized by state governments to fight for the Union.

27 ⁸ Haag, *The Gunning of America*, 70.

28 ⁹ Haag, *The Gunning of America*, 76.

1 been bought with the soldiers' own money. By contrast, the U.S. government had
2 purchased nearly 107,000 Spencer single-shot rifles for use by the army.¹⁰

3 25. Meanwhile during the Civil War, the Confederate War Department
4 also never adopted Henry Rifles. Whether that was by choice is unclear. Oliver
5 Winchester, who had the greatest control of the company that made Henrys,
6 declared that he did not want the weapons sold to Confederates. His policy may
7 have been due to pure loyalty to the Union cause or to fear that he would be
8 charged with treason by the U.S. government if he facilitated gun sales to the
9 rebels. Some Confederate soldiers were able to acquire Henrys by theft or by using
10 agents who purchased them in the North and smuggled them to the South.¹¹ Most
11 Confederates knew about the weapon. A widely-circulated story told of a
12 Confederate soldier who called the gun "that damned Yankee rifle that can be
13 loaded on Sunday and fired all week." One of the soldiers in Robert E. Lee's Army
14 of Northern Virginia regretted that "we never did secure the Winchester."¹² Some
15 Confederate soldiers did manage to obtain Henry-Winchesters, either by smuggling
16 or, more commonly, by confiscating them from captured Union soldiers. In late
17 1862, for example, a number of pro-Union Kentucky soldiers who had just acquired
18 Henry Rifles were overrun by pro-Confederate Kentuckians and Tennesseans. As
19 many as 300 Henry rifles ended up in Confederate hands as a result.¹³ These
20 weapons probably did not stay with the southerners for very long. By June 1865,
21 all of the major Confederate armies had surrendered. Typically, surrender required
22 all Confederate soldiers to "stack arms." If they had sidearms, they could keep

23 ¹⁰ Haag, *The Gunning of America*, 81.
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25 ¹¹ Ibid., 65. For evidence that U.S. authorities would have regarded the sale
26 of Henrys to Confederates as treasonous, and thus that Winchester had good reason
to avoid such sales, see Haag, *The Gunning of America*, 90.

27 ¹² Harold F. Williamson, *Winchester: The Gun That Won the West*
(Washington, D.C.: Combat Forces Press, 1952), 38.

28 ¹³ Haag, *The Gunning of America*, 76.

1 them, but any rifles had to be relinquished. Confederate veterans would thus have
2 been prohibited from having Henry-Winchesters. At least some ex-Confederate
3 soldiers ended up with Henry-Winchesters, however, though not legally. If they
4 failed to turn in their rifles, they were in violation of the “parole” agreement that
5 protected them from imprisonment after surrender. Some ex-Confederates
6 managed to get Henry-Winchesters by stealing them from U.S. army depots.
7 Others bought them from smugglers who had gotten the weapons in Mexico and
8 then carried them across the border to Texas. Henry-Winchesters were easier to
9 find in Mexico than in the U.S. in 1864-1867. They had been sold by the thousands
10 to the Juaristas, the rebel force that would ultimately wrest Mexico from
11 Maximilian, the self-proclaimed “Emperor” installed in Mexico City by Napoleon
12 III of France.

13 26. Not only the Juaristas but other non-U.S., non-Confederate armies
14 possessed Henry-Winchesters. Indeed, foreign armies were the main market for
15 Henry-Winchester manufacturers during Reconstruction. Had it not been for the
16 war in Mexico, along with the Franco-Prussian War and the various armed conflicts
17 between the Russian and Ottoman empires—all wars involving thousands of
18 Henry-Winchesters—the manufacturers of these weapons would likely have gone
19 bankrupt.¹⁴

20 27. In the United States by 1866, Henry-Winchesters did exist, to be sure,
21 but in much smaller numbers than in foreign countries. U.S. veterans of the Civil
22 War could possess Henry rifles. Beginning in May 1865, U.S. army volunteers
23 began mustering out in significant numbers. The non-regular U.S. army (that is, the
24 volunteer force), nearly a million strong by April 1865, would fall well below
25 100,000 by the end of the year. Unlike ex-Confederate soldiers, ex-U.S. soldiers
26 could keep their rifles upon discharge. This meant that U.S. soldiers at the time
27

28 ¹⁴ Ibid., 109-42.

1 who had Henry rifles might continue to possess them once they re-entered civilian
2 life. However, the number of such U.S. veterans who kept their Henrys was small,
3 perhaps 7,500,¹⁵ and those that opted to keep them paid dearly. The U.S. army did
4 not simply give weapons away for free to discharging soldiers who had acquired
5 them at no cost from their military units. Rather, soldiers wanting to keep their
6 weapons had to buy them at market value. A Spencer carbine (a short-barreled,
7 repeating rifle, and one of the most popular weapons among U.S. soldiers), would
8 cost a discharging soldier about \$10 (roughly \$175 in 2022 dollars). A Henry
9 would cost at least \$30 (roughly \$525 in 2022 dollars). A private in the U.S. army
10 typically made \$13 per month. If he had a Spencer that he wanted to buy, he would
11 have to pay less than one month's wages—not a bad deal for a perfectly sound and
12 popular rifle. If he wanted to buy a Henry, though, that would cost him more than
13 two months' wages, and there would be little to persuade him that the difference in
14 price corresponded to the difference in value. The result was that very few Henrys
15 were purchased by discharged U.S. soldiers. According to a U.S. army report, 808
16 Henrys were purchased by discharging Civil War soldiers, compared to 8,289
17 Spencer Carbines.¹⁶ Henrys that were not purchased went to the U.S. War
18 Department's ordnance department, which did not sell them.

19

20 ¹⁵ The figure of 7,500 Henrys kept by pro-Union soldiers after the war is
21 reached in the following way. 8,500 had been purchased by or for U.S. soldiers.
22 See *ibid.*, 81. Of these, roughly 2,000 were purchased for soldiers (based on a
23 count of regiments known to have bought the rifles with public funds). Thus 6,500
24 Henrys were privately owned by soldiers. Of the roughly 2,000 Henrys purchased
25 for soldiers, 808 were known to have been bought by the soldiers at the end of the
war. See 42nd Cong., 2nd sess., S. Doc. 183, “Sale of Ordnance Stores,” *U.S. Congressional Serial Set* (1871), pp. 167-172. Thus, a generous estimate of how many U.S. veterans had Henrys after the war is 7,500.

26 ¹⁶ General Orders, No. 101, May 30, 1865, *The War of the Rebellion*
27 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), ser. 3, vol. 5, p. 43;
42nd Cong., 2nd sess., S. Doc. 183, “Sale of Ordnance Stores,” *U.S. Congressional Serial Set* (1871), pp. 167-172.

1 28. By the end of the Civil War in 1865, very few combatants had used
2 Henry Rifles, and fewer still had kept them once they were discharged. The result
3 was that only a small number of Henrys were in circulation in the United States
4 immediately after the war—perhaps 10,000, and this in a country of roughly 35
5 million people.¹⁷ Those veterans who possessed the guns understood that they were
6 weapons of war—they had used them as such—rather than weapons of individual
7 self-defense. Maybe veterans kept them as souvenirs, maybe as commodities to be
8 sold at a later date, maybe as novelties to be displayed at local shooting contests or
9 social gatherings (rifle clubs and shooting galleries were common in the North).
10 Maybe they planned to travel to or through the Western Territories, where Henrys
11 were gaining a reputation as good weapons against hostile Native Americans or
12 roaming bands of criminals, known as “highwaymen” or “road agents.” Regardless
13 of why a U.S. veteran might have kept a Henry, he would have understood that it
14 was an uncommon weapon, and one not intended for individual self-defense. It was
15 strictly a weapon of war.

16 **D. State Secession, State Readmission, State Redemption**

17 29. Reconstruction was a time period (1863-1877) but also a process. The
18 process was described by President Abraham Lincoln in his last public speech
19 (April 11, 1865) as getting “the seceded States, so called,” which were “out of their
20 proper practical relation with the Union,” back into their “proper practical relation”
21 with the Union.¹⁸ To better understand this process, one must understand the

22 ¹⁷ 11,000 Henry Rifles were produced between 1861 and 1865; see Parsons,
23 *The First Winchester*, 48. Assuming that all were sold—a generous assumption—
24 then 2,500 were sold to civilians and 8,500 to U.S. soldiers (the 8,500 figure comes
25 from note 11 above). Of the 8,500 U.S. soldiers who had Henrys, 7,500 kept them
26 after the war; see note 11 above. Thus 10,000 Henrys were in circulation after the
27 war (again, a generous estimate). The U.S. census of 1860 reported just over 31
28 million Americans; the census of 1870 reported just over 38 million. Thus 35
million is given as an estimate of the population of the United States in 1865.

18 Roy P. Basler, ed., *Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln* (New Brunswick,
N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1953), 8:403-4.

1 meaning of key terms used during the Reconstruction period: state secession, state
2 readmission, and state redemption.

3 **1. State Secession**

4 30. Lincoln used the phrase “seceded States, so called” because he did not
5 accept the constitutionality of state secession. All eleven states of the Confederacy
6 had declared themselves “seceded” from the Union by May 20, 1861. The
7 governments of all of these states regarded state secession, by which they meant a
8 breaking-off from the Union, as constitutional. The Lincoln administration rejected
9 this interpretation and declared instead that the “so-called” seceded states had
10 remained in the Union but had had their governments overtaken by disloyal,
11 insurrectionary groups. Reconstruction, therefore, would be complete when all of
12 the “so-called” seceded states had governments that were loyal to the Union. The
13 presidential administrations of the Reconstruction era that followed Lincoln’s
14 (Andrew Johnson’s and Ulysses S. Grant’s) adopted this understanding of
15 secession. So, too, did all the Reconstruction-era Congresses, though a minority of
16 Congressmen took a somewhat different view, claiming that secession was indeed
17 unconstitutional but that the states in question had indeed broken off from the
18 Union and therefore could be treated as territories. This Report does not delve into
19 the question of the constitutionality of secession. It simply notes that U.S.
20 lawmakers of the Reconstruction era generally regarded secession as
21 unconstitutional and a form of insurrection.

22 **2. State Readmission**

23 31. There were competing views among U.S. lawmakers during
24 Reconstruction as to when a “so-called” seceded state could be deemed
25 “readmitted” to the Union. The dominant view among U.S. lawmakers was that a
26 state was deemed readmitted when Congress agreed to seat Representatives and
27 Senators from that state. This meaning of state readmission is used in this Report.
28 In justifying federal intervention into “so-called” seceded states and the imposition

1 of qualifications on states for readmission, national law makers relied on two
2 constitutional principles: 1) “war powers”; and 2) the “guarantee clause”—the
3 clause of the U.S. Constitution declaring that “The United States shall guarantee to
4 every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government” (U.S.C., Art. IV, Sec.
5 4). This Report does not delve into the question of the legitimacy and scope of
6 these constitutional principles. It simply notes that these were the principles of the
7 time used to justify federal policy towards the “so-called” seceded states during
8 Reconstruction.

9 **3. State Redemption**

10 32. Between 1866 and 1871, all of the “so-called” seceded states were
11 readmitted to the Union. At the point of readmission, each state had a government
12 that was loyal to the Union and controlled by a political party affiliated with the
13 national Republican Party, which for all the years of Reconstruction was the Party
14 in control of the U.S. government. In 1866-68, the last years of the administration
15 of Andrew Johnson, he renounced the Republican Party and declared himself a
16 Democrat, which he had been prior to the Civil War, but the U.S. government as a
17 whole was still Republican. The Republicans in Congress beginning in December
18 1866 had a two-thirds majority that allowed them to override Johnson’s vetoes; and
19 beginning in March 1867, with the Reconstruction Act, they effectively took
20 control of the “Commander-in-Chief” powers typically vested in the Executive
21 branch. In each state after readmission there was internal conflict. Part of that
22 conflict involved efforts by Democrats, many of whom were former Confederates
23 or Confederate-sympathizers, to take control of the state government from
24 Republicans. By 1877, the Democrats had taken control of the governments of all
25 the states of the former Confederacy. At the point when Democrats took control of
26 a state, they declared the state “redeemed” and began rolling back reforms instituted
27 by prior Republican state authorities. In this Report, state redemption means the
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1 period when Democrats declared a state “redeemed” and began instituting
2 reactionary measures.

3 **E. Militias**

4 33. Militias have a long history in the United States, and they have been
5 studied extensively by scholars investigating the Second Amendment, especially for
6 the period of Colonial America and the Early Republic. Militias existed during
7 Reconstruction, but the militias of that period were fundamentally different from
8 the militias of the earlier periods.

9 34. By the time that the Civil War broke out in 1861, well-organized state
10 militias such as had existed in the Early Republic technically existed but were
11 practically defunct, except in frontier states like Missouri and Texas. Militias by
12 1861 essentially existed as volunteer local groups authorized by state governments
13 but were only lightly controlled by those governments. Such militias were used, to
14 be sure. Local militias in Virginia in 1859, for example, had worked together with
15 a unit of the U.S. army commanded by Robert E. Lee to put down the effort by
16 John Brown to seize the U.S. armory at Harpers Ferry and distribute arms to
17 enslaved Black Americans in the region.

18 35. The fact that state militias did technically exist by 1861 became very
19 important once the Civil War broke out. The power under the U.S. Constitution for
20 a President to call up state militias is what Abraham Lincoln invoked at the start of
21 the war when he authorized up to 75,000 men to come together to put down the
22 insurrection in the southern states. The Confederate States of America, which
23 adopted a constitution quite similar to the U.S. Constitution, invoked this same
24 authority when calling up its national army.

25 36. Although soldiers had been called to national armies in their role as
26 state militiamen, the armed units that formed the basis of national armies during the
27 Civil War were not state-based militia units but rather state-formed regiments
28 approved as national army units by the U.S. War Department (hence only in rare

1 instances would a regiment be a replica of a local militia unit). Nonetheless, the
2 national armies continued to be managed at times by laws designed in the pre-war
3 era to manage state militias. In July 1862, for example, the United States passed a
4 Militia Act that standardized the terms of membership in state-wide militias even
5 though state-wide militias had grown defunct in the North prior to the war; only in
6 this way—by legislating via the old state militia system—did the U.S. War
7 Department have the authority to manage the personnel of the national army. The
8 July 1862 Act significantly declared that Black Americans could not be denied
9 admission to state militias. That was a pivotal development, as most state militias
10 prior to the war (all of them in the South, most of those in the North), had denied
11 membership to Black Americans.

12 37. When the Civil War ended in mid-1865, state militias, which had been
13 given new life by the war, thrived, but not everywhere. In the North, they fell again
14 into disuse, though they would begin to appear again with strength in the late 1870s
15 and 1880s. In the border states of Missouri and Kentucky, which had remained
16 loyal to the Union despite being slave states, state militias continued to be
17 important, as guerrillas caused disturbances in the states long after the Civil War
18 was over. In the states of the former Confederacy after the war, the state militias
19 had the most visible—and notorious—presence. Invoking newly passed
20 discriminatory state laws (“Black Codes”), or simply acting on their own discretion,
21 southern state militias, which excluded all Black Americans, harassed, assaulted,
22 and even killed Black Americans and pro-Union whites. These militias were
23 composed mostly of former Confederate soldiers, many of whom wore their
24 Confederate uniforms while in action. These militias were regarded by U.S.
25 lawmakers as pernicious and unlawful. Leaving aside the obvious illegality of the
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1 many acts committed by these militias, they were in violation of U.S. law simply by
2 wearing Confederate uniforms.¹⁹

3 38. In March 1867, the U.S. Congress abolished all southern state militias,
4 with some exceptions. Exempted were the border states, the four slave states that
5 had never seceded, though Kentucky and Missouri were the only border states with
6 state militias, and both states would disband their militias by 1868. Also exempted
7 were two states that had joined the Confederacy: Arkansas and Tennessee.²⁰
8 Arkansas was exempted because it had proven itself to President Johnson as a
9 genuinely loyal state. It had established a loyal state government, led by Governor
10 Powell Clayton, that conformed to the guidelines that Abraham Lincoln had laid
11 out in December 1863 and that Johnson had affirmed soon after taking office.
12 Arkansas in 1868 created a state militia that U.S. authorities regarded as a
13 legitimate armed organization loyal to the United States.²¹ Tennessee was
14 exempted because it, too, had established a loyal state government, led by Governor
15 William (“Parson”) Brownlow. It had gone one step further. It had ratified the
16 Fourteenth Amendment, passed by Congress in mid-1866, thus becoming the first
17 southern state to do so and, as a result, becoming the first formerly seceded state to
18 be formally readmitted to the Union. With Brownlow’s urging, Tennessee in 1866
19 had created a state militia, the “Tennessee State Guard.” This organization was
20 composed of both white and black members; it was well-armed (with Enfield

21 ¹⁹ James Speed, “Surrender of the Rebel Army of Northern Virginia,” April
22 22, 1865, *Opinions of the Attorney General*, 11:208-09. For these immediate post-
23 war southern militias, see William A. Blair, *The Record of Murders and Outrages:
Racial Violence and the Fight Over Truth at the Dawn of Reconstruction* (Chapel
24 Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2021), 66-67.

25 ²⁰ 14 U.S. Statutes 487, Chap. 170, Sec. 6 (Approved March 2, 1867); James
26 E. Sefton, *The United States Army and Reconstruction*, 1865-1877 (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1967), 112.

27 ²¹ Michael G. Lindsey, “Localism and the Creation of a State Police in
28 Arkansas,” *Arkansas Historical Quarterly*, 64 (Winter 2005), 356-58.

1 single-shot rifles, not with Henrys or Winchesters); and it drilled regularly. Former
2 Confederates in the state despised the force.²²

3 39. After Congress in 1867 abolished all but the exempted southern state
4 militias, some of the newly created pro-Union governments in the non-exempted
5 southern states created new state militias that were expressly tasked with subduing
6 insurrection and anti-black activities. Such states included Louisiana, North
7 Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas. Loyal state governments in Alabama and
8 Florida proclaimed an intention to organize such new state militias, but they never
9 followed through. A loyal government in Mississippi in 1870 went so far as to
10 organize such a state militia, but the force was never used. The state militias of the
11 South that did exist and saw action, those in Arkansas, Louisiana, North Carolina,
12 Tennessee, South Carolina, and Texas, were wholly new innovations (though Texas
13 made the dubious claim that the pre-war Texas Rangers was a predecessor
14 organization). The new, post-1867 southern state militias were under the direct
15 control of the state (the Governor and/or state adjutant general), as opposed to
16 merely authorized by the governor. They drilled and paraded regularly. They were
17 paid and armed by the state, with the arms kept in state-maintained, state-guarded
18 armories or arsenals. Finally, all of the militias allowed if not encouraged Black
19 American men to join, though some, like North Carolina's, segregated white
20 companies from black companies. The high number of Black Americans in the
21 southern state militias led some people at the time as well as some early historians
22 to call these organizations "Negro Militias." This Report does not use that label.
23 Pre-Civil War state militias in the South, in contrast to these wholly new post-war
24 organizations, were unpaid, self-armed, and all-white.²³

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26 ²² Ben H. Severance, *Tennessee's Radical Army: The State Guard and Its*
27 *Role in Reconstruction, 1867-1869* (Knoxville: University Press of Tennessee,
2005), 1-119.

28 ²³ Otis A. Singletary, *Negro Militia and Reconstruction* (Austin: University

1 40. Two of the new southern state militias, those of Louisiana and South
2 Carolina, are particularly relevant to the subject of this Report. As will be
3 discussed below, the state militias of Louisiana and South Carolina—and only those
4 state militias—were armed with Winchester Repeating Rifles.

5 41. The composition of and membership requirements of the new state
6 militias indicate much about attitudes toward firearms regulation among law
7 makers of the time. The inclusion of Black Americans in the militias was part of a
8 larger understanding among Republicans in the era of the Fourteenth Amendment
9 that regulations restricting blacks from possessing firearms were no longer to be
10 regarded as constitutional. The new militias did more than include blacks. They
11 excluded some whites, specifically those who were regarded as still supporting the
12 Confederate cause. Thus, the new state militias that began forming in 1868, the
13 same year as the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, indicated that lawmakers
14 understood that Black Americans' security required not simply the absence of
15 regulations denying them arms but the presence of regulations denying arms to
16 those who were known to support insurrection against the United States and
17 violence against blacks.

18 **F. The U.S. Army During Reconstruction**

19 42. The U.S. army began occupying parts of the South as soon as the Civil
20 War broke out and would not end its occupation until 1877, the end of
21 Reconstruction, when it removed its last units from Florida, Louisiana, and South
22 Carolina. During the war, the U.S. army had exclusive police powers in the
23 occupied South until or unless local policing institutions—courts and
24 constabularies—were deemed loyal to the United States. At that point, the U.S.
25 army cooperated with local police institutions to “keep the peace.” Yet U.S.

26 of Texas Press, 1957), 3-33; Otis A. Singletary, “The Texas Militia During
27 Reconstruction,” *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, 60 (July 1956), 25-28; Allan
28 Robert Purcell, “The History of the Texas Militia, 1835-1903” (Ph.D. diss.,
University of Texas, Austin, 1981), 221-27.

1 commanders retained the power, which they had had since the start of the war, to
2 declare martial law in an area, thus suspending the civil institutions there. This
3 arrangement carried over from the Civil War into the early years of post-war
4 Reconstruction. Until April 1866, U.S. troops had unrestrained power to operate
5 within state boundaries to keep the peace. As part of that power, they could use
6 troops as police and hold their own courts that could try civilians.²⁴

7 43. The army also was willing to use this power in states that had never
8 declared themselves seceded. The army had overseen arrests and prosecutions of
9 alleged traitors in Indiana in 1864, actions that were ultimately deemed
10 unconstitutional in the U.S. Supreme Court's post-war *Milligan* opinion. In June
11 1866, the army had intervened in New York and Vermont to capture Irish
12 nationalists known as Fenians who had fought against British troops in Canada and
13 then crossed over to the United States. (Neither Henrys nor Winchesters were used
14 in the conflicts between the Fenians and Canadian troops.) General-in-Chief
15 Ulysses S. Grant ordered General George Meade to inform the New York and
16 Vermont governors that they should call out volunteer militia units to capture the
17 Fenians.²⁵

18 44. The federal-state structure of armed enforcement that took place
19 during the 1866 Fenian crisis was the model that U.S. authorities had in mind for
20 the South once the southern states began creating pro-Union state militias. The
21 hope was that the southern states would end up like New York and Vermont during
22 the Fenian crisis: they would develop and sustain new, pro-Republican state
23 militias that would be the primary armed force in the states, with the U.S. army
24 playing only an ancillary role.

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²⁴ Sefton, *The U.S. Army and Reconstruction*, 5-106.

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²⁵ W. S. Neidhardt, *Fenianism in North America* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1975), 71.

1 45. This plan for U.S. army-southern state militia cooperation nearly came
2 apart beginning in April 1866. In that month, President Andrew Johnson
3 proclaimed that a state of “cessation of hostilities” existed in all the southern states
4 but Texas (in August 1866 he would proclaim that in Texas, too, there was a
5 “cessation of hostilities). Johnson thus effectively removed “war powers” as a
6 constitutional justification for the army’s presence in the South. His move was part
7 of his general turn against the Republican program of Reconstruction. Also in
8 April 1866, he vetoed the Civil Rights Act of 1866, a veto that Congress overrode.
9 Two months earlier, he had vetoed the act renewing the Freedman’s Bureau.
10 Eventually, Congress passed a new act for the Bureau, which Johnson again vetoed
11 but Congress overrode. Both the Civil Rights Act and the Freedman’s Bureau Act
12 established, among other things, that the army would continue to have policing
13 powers in the southern states. Those powers were to be used specifically to put
14 down insurrectionaries who threatened to undermine the civil rights of Black
15 Americans or in any way jeopardize pro-Union citizens and institutions. The Civil
16 Rights Act contained a military provision that empowered the army to act reactively
17 or preemptively against any actual or anticipated insurrectionary threat.²⁶ Even
18 though Congress was able to sustain this military provision as well as the rest of the
19 Civil Rights Act of 1866 against Johnson’s veto, the military provision was
20 jeopardized by Johnson’s declaration of a “cessation of hostilities.” The declaration
21 signaled that Johnson might not sustain the army in its duties specified by
22 Congressional measures like the Civil Rights Act. Also in April 1866, the U.S.
23 Supreme Court announced that it was ruling in favor of the plaintiff in the *Milligan*
24 case (the actual opinion was not issued until January 1867). That case was
25 narrowly about the power of the army to try civilians in areas where civil courts

26 ²⁶ Michael Vorenberg, “The 1866 Civil Rights Act and the Beginning of
27 Military Reconstruction,” in Christian Samito, ed., *The Greatest and the Grandest
Act: The Civil Rights Act of 1866 from Reconstruction to Today* (Carbondale, Ill.:
28 Southern Illinois University Press, 2018), 60-88.

1 were operative; more broadly it was about the power of the army to have any
2 authority at all to occupy an area ostensibly at peace.

3 46. U.S. Republican authorities moved quickly to protect their power to
4 occupy the formerly rebel South. Secretary of War Stanton prepared an order that
5 invoked the military provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to justify continued
6 military occupation of the South. This was a novel move, as it allowed military
7 occupation in the absence of “war powers.” The Civil Rights Act was justified not
8 by “war powers” but by the Thirteenth Amendment abolishing slavery. A small
9 number of Republicans, most notably Representative John Bingham, thought the
10 Civil Rights Act needed more justification than that. For this reason, among others,
11 Bingham pressed for a new constitutional amendment, which ultimately emerged as
12 the Fourteenth Amendment. The resolution for the amendment was passed by
13 Congress a few months after the Civil Rights Act and sent to the states for
14 ratification. Congress would ultimately declare that the Civil Rights Act of 1866
15 was authorized by the Fourteenth as well as the Thirteenth Amendments.

16 47. The military provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was not enough
17 to put U.S. military occupation of the South on sure footing. The President still
18 controlled the army in his capacity as commander-in-chief. Congress thus began to
19 wrest control of the army from President Johnson. First, it passed the
20 Reconstruction Act of 1867, which formalized military occupation and required
21 southern states to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment in order to be readmitted to the
22 Union. Then Congress passed measures (most notably the Tenure of Office Act)
23 that shifted aspects of army control from the President to Congress. Then it
24 impeached Johnson, though Johnson was ultimately acquitted by the Senate. In the
25 meantime, the army and the U.S. Attorney General opted to take the narrowest
26 possible reading of the Milligan decision, such that the only power deemed out of
27 the army’s hands in occupied areas was the power to try civilians if civilian courts
28 were operative. By 1868, then, the year of the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption,

1 the U.S. army had secured for itself a place in the southern states as a legitimate
2 occupying force in the South. It would affirm this status with the acts of 1870 and
3 1871 enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Fifteenth Amendment,
4 which had been adopted in 1870. The last of these enforcement acts, the so-called
5 “KKK Act,” was aimed directly at breaking up the Ku Klux Klan and similar
6 insurrectionary, paramilitary organizations that terrorized Black Americans and
7 pro-Union whites (“terror” was one of the most commonly used words of the time
8 to describe the Klan’s intent toward Black Americans).

9 48. The reason to understand this sequence of events is to appreciate the
10 army’s distinctive, unprecedented role in the era of the Fourteenth Amendment. It
11 did not operate under martial law. It had the power to declare martial law, but in
12 practice, it avoided using that power. Instead, it looked to pro-Republican state
13 governors to declare martial law if martial law was deemed necessary (and such
14 gubernatorial declarations were extraordinarily rare during Reconstruction).
15 Furthermore, in the wake of *Milligan*, it yielded to the states the judicial power it
16 had wielded prior to 1866. States’ attorneys and state courts were to be the main
17 sites of judicial action, though the U.S. Attorney General reserved the power to
18 remove cases to federal courts if they involved matters relating to civil and political
19 rights covered by national legislation (to help centralize federal judicial activity in
20 the South, the Department of Justice was created in 1870). During the era of the
21 Fourteenth Amendment, then, the main role of the U.S. army was to act as an
22 ancillary police force to the state militias or other local and state policing
23 operations. In this capacity, the army worked with states to detect and arrest
24 insurrectionaries and civil-rights violators. Although sometimes those arrested
25 would stand trial in a federal court—this happened most famously in the South
26 Carolina Ku Klux Klan trials of 1871-72—the army and agents of the Department
27 of Justice looked to the state courts to be the primary judicial institutions of locales.
28 As an example: President Ulysses S. Grant in 1871, in his capacity as commander-

1 in-chief of the U.S. army, ordered all insurrectionaries in South Carolina to turn in
2 their firearms to legitimate authorities. If insurrectionaries were found who had not
3 turned in their weapons, they could be arrested and denied habeas corpus rights
4 under Grant's order.²⁷ However, prosecutions and trials of such insurrectionaries
5 going forward would be conducted by state authorities, if those authorities were
6 known to be loyal to the United States. In its capacity as an ancillary police force
7 to state militias, with both armed organizations committed to subduing
8 insurrectionaries and civil-rights violators, the U.S. army sought to prevent
9 weapons from reaching unlawful insurgent groups. Army officers relied on their
10 own intelligence operators as well as private intelligence agencies like the
11 Pinkertons to learn of arms shipments. By the terms of the Civil Rights Act of
12 1866 and the Enforcement Acts of 1870, the U.S. army and related military units
13 were authorized to act preemptively to prevent insurrectionaries from making
14 armed assaults on loyal Unionists. The seizure of weapons intended for
15 insurrectionaries thus represented a lawful use of military authority under the
16 Fourteenth Amendment.²⁸

17 49. As a result, any southern person or combination of persons considering
18 having Henry or Winchester rifles shipped to them faced the prospect that the U.S.
19 army or state militia might keep the shipment from reaching them and that, even if
20 the shipment did reach them, the policing forces could arrest them and confiscate
21 the weapons.

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23 ²⁷ Proclamations of President Ulysses S. Grant, in James Richardson, ed., *A*
24 *Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents* (New York: Bureau of
25 National Literature, 1897), vol. 9, pp. 4086-87 (March 24, 1871), 4089-90 (Oct. 12,
26 1871), 4090-92 (Oct. 17, 1871), 4092-93 (Nov. 3, 1871; this proclamation revoked
suspension of habeas corpus in Marion County, South Carolina), 4093-4095 (Nov.
10, 1871).

27 ²⁸ No U.S. court ever denied the constitutionality of such seizures of weapons
28 or the legislation that authorized the seizures. See Vorenberg, "The 1866 Civil
Rights Act and the Beginning of Military Reconstruction."

1 **V. FINDINGS: HIGH-CAPACITY FIREARMS DURING RECONSTRUCTION**

2 **A. Overview: Henry Rifles and Winchester Repeating Rifles**
3 **During Reconstruction**

4 50. An oft-cited scholar in legal debates over firearms contends that “the
5 Winchester Model 1866 . . . became a huge commercial success. So by the time the
6 Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, rifles holding more than 10 rounds
7 were common in America.” The first part of this statement is true: the “Winchester
8 66” did become a commercial success. The author neglects to mention, however,
9 that prior to the end of Reconstruction, that commercial success was due almost
10 entirely to sales to foreign armies. Thus it does not follow that the success of the
11 company during Reconstruction is evidence of the presence of Winchesters in the
12 United States. Indeed, the author’s second statement, that “rifles holding more than
13 10 rounds were common in America” at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment, is
14 false.²⁹

15 ²⁹ David Kopel, “The History of Magazines holding 11 or more rounds: Amicus brief in 9th Circuit,” *Washington Post*, May 29, 2014, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/05/29/the-history-of-magazines-holding-11-or-more-rounds-amicus-brief-in-9th-circuit/> (accessed September 22, 2022). Kopel’s contention also appears on page 4 of his co-authored Amicus Brief in a federal case from California, *Fyock v. City of Sunnyvale*, Case No. 14-15408 (9th Cir. 2015). See David B. Kopel and John Parker Sweeney, “Amici Curiae Brief for the Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence and Gun Owners of California in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants and Supporting Reversal,” 2014 WL 2445166 (9th Cir.). For the number of Henrys and Winchesters manufactured 1861-1877, as well as the number of these rifles shipped to foreign armies, see John E. Parsons, *The First Winchester: The Story of the 1866 Repeating Rifle* (New York: Morrow, 1955), 48, 85, 88, 103, 116, 123. To understand the scale of these numbers, one should contrast them to the production and sales of other rifles of the era. For example, according to Parsons, the total number of Henrys and Winchesters manufactured in 1861-1877 was 164,466 (this includes the 56,000 shipped to foreign armies), whereas in the same period, 845,713 Springfield “trap-door” single-shot rifles were manufactured. See “Serial Number Ranges for Springfield Armory-Manufactured Military Firearms,” <http://npshistory.com/publications/spar/serial-nos.pdf>, pp. 1-3; some of the data in this report is aggregated and printed at the Springfield Armory U.S. National Park Website: <https://www.nps.gov/spar/learn/historyculture/u-s-springfield-trapdoor-production-serial-numbers.htm>.

1 51. Rifles holding more than 10 rounds made up a tiny fraction of all
2 firearms in the United States during Reconstruction. Furthermore, as will be
3 discussed in more detail below, possession of such rifles—legal possession, that
4 is—was limited almost exclusively to U.S. soldiers and civilian law enforcement
5 officers.

6 **B. Henrys and Winchesters in the Reconstruction-Era West**

7 52. One of the places that Henrys and Winchesters could be found during
8 Reconstruction was in the West, though the weapons did not proliferate there at the
9 time at anything like the scale invented by novelists and film-makers of the late
10 nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

11 53. With the passage of the Homestead Act (1862), the end of the Civil
12 War (1865), the completion of the first transcontinental railroad (1869), and the
13 discovery of gold in the Black Hills of Dakota Territory, the appeal of traveling to
14 or through the Western Territories increased. Because law enforcement was
15 minimal in the region, and also because the U.S. army could offer travelers and
16 settlers little protection—they were too consumed during the era with subduing
17 Native Americans—Americans came to regard self-defense as particularly
18 important in the region. The Winchester company tried to capitalize on the
19 situation by touting the benefits of its rifle. The “Winchester 73” model in
20 particular was aimed at Westerners or potential Westerners. The company
21 emphasized that the speed and high capacity of the rifle allowed a single person to
22 hold off a band of outlaws or hostile Native Americans.³⁰ The marketing campaign

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³⁰ See, for example, the ad printed over three issues in the *Wyoming Leader*
25 (March 17, April 21, May 8, 1868, always p. 4). Ads for Winchesters that said
26 nothing of their possible purposes appeared occasionally in newspapers published
27 in the in Western Territories; see for example, a gun dealer’s ad for “Sharps and
28 Winchester Rifles” as specialties: *Bismarck Tri-Weekly Tribune* (Dakota Territory),
June 29, 1877, p. 4. On the post-Reconstruction invention of the myth of
Winchesters proliferating in the Reconstruction-era West, see Haag, *The Gunning
of America*, 179-202, 353-68.

1 was aimed especially at Americans hoping to travel to the Western Territories. The
2 campaign had minimal success.

3 54. Many travelers to the West carried firearms, to be sure, but a very
4 small number of those arms were Henrys or Winchesters. Most of the accounts of
5 privately held Winchesters during Reconstruction that I found in the research for
6 this Report did come from the Western Territories, but there were fewer than fifteen
7 such accounts that were not expressly fictional. Two such accounts became
8 legendary, mainly because the manufacturers of the Henry-Winchesters used them
9 to advertise their rifles. One account was of two former U.S. soldiers who were
10 part of a mining operation in the Rocky Mountains and used their Henry Rifles to
11 defeat some raiding Blackfoot Indians. Another was of a private guard hired by
12 Wells Fargo to accompany a cash shipment to the West; he was attacked by robbers
13 near Nevada City and used his Henry Rifle to kill them all. It might be noted that
14 these stories, assuming they are true, did not involve individual self-defense by
15 ordinary civilians. They involved defense of economic enterprises by trained
16 gunmen.³¹ Less oft-told incidents involving Henrys and Winchesters from the
17 Western Territories involved brutal violence between thuggish combatants. There
18 was no heroic road warrior or “Indian fighter” in these tales, and thus they were not
19 likely to build appeal for the rifles. Particularly gruesome were the murder-by-
20 Winchester accounts stemming from the Horrell-Higgins feud in New Mexico
21 Territory near the Texas border.³²

22 55. Because some Henrys and Winchesters found their way to the Western
23 Territories, and because some of the U.S. army operations against Native
24 Americans took place in Western *states* as well as the Western Territories, Henrys
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26 ³¹ Williamson, *Winchester*, 42-44.

27 ³² C. L. Sonnichsen, *I'll Die Before I'll Run: The Story of the Great Feuds of*
28 *Texas* (1951; 2nd ed., New York: Devin-Adair, 1962), 125-49.

1 and Winchesters may have ended up in the Western states during Reconstruction
2 (these included California, Colorado, Nevada, and Oregon). However, I found no
3 significant evidence of Henrys or Winchesters in the Western states.³³

4 56. The Winchester company hoped that West-bound Americans' desire to
5 hunt, and not just their wish for protection, would fuel sales of their weapon. The
6 great bison hunts on the Plains were famous by the late 1860s, and the Winchester
7 company tried to capitalize on the craze. Its marketing effort failed. Bison-hunters
8 preferred other models. It did not help that the most famous Western hunter of the
9 time, Buffalo Bill Cody, did not use a Winchester. His famous gun, which he
10 dubbed "Lucretia Borgia," was a single-shot Springfield.

11 57. The Winchester company had only marginally more success trying to
12 sell its guns elsewhere to hunters and "sportsmen," a term used to describe not only
13 hunters but competitive target-shooters. The only place where Winchesters caught
14 on for hunting was in Africa, where American and European "big game" hunters
15 wanted to shoot large animals with as many rounds as possible, in as fast a time as
16 possible, in order to avoid being killed by the prey.³⁴ Target-shooters demanded
17 accuracy of their guns, and potential buyers worried that a rifle built for capacity
18 and speed would lose something in accuracy. To assuage such concerns, a
19 Winchester model that began selling in early 1877 (the "Winchester 76") came with

20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ³³ Exceptions to this statement about the absence of Henry-Winchesters in
western states are the state armories in these states. Reports from these armories
sometimes mention the rifles. For example, the armory in the state penitentiary at
Salem, Oregon in 1868 had 13 Henry rifles and zero Winchesters, compared to
hundreds of other firearms. Because this was a penitentiary armory, the Henrys that
were there necessarily were for use by law enforcement officers, not individuals
seeking self-defense. "Penitentiary Report" to Legislative Assembly, September
1868 (Salem, Oregon: W. A. McPherson, 1868), pp. 94-95.

³⁴ My research uncovered fewer than ten accounts of African big-game
hunting that appeared in U.S. publications during Reconstruction. As an example,
see "Lovejoy," "Letter from Africa," *Fayette County Herald* (Washington, Ohio),
Dec. 21, 1871, p.2 (by "accounts" I mean supposedly true accounts; there were
even more accounts that were expressly fictional).

1 the option of a “set trigger,” such that the shooter could set the trigger by moving it
2 very slightly forward, at which point only a tiny bit of pull would set off the shot.
3 The “set trigger” type of Winchester was more popular at shooting contests than
4 earlier Winchesters, but it still was not as popular as other rifles, especially
5 Remingtons and Springfields. One reason why was its price. The “set trigger”
6 version of the Winchester was typically \$10 more than the “standard trigger”
7 models, which already were on the expensive side (“standard trigger” Winchesters
8 were typically 20-30% more expensive than Remingtons and Springfields).

9 58. Meanwhile, U.S. army units in the West rarely possessed Winchesters
10 during Reconstruction. The army had continued its Civil War-era policy of non-
11 adoption of Winchesters. Yet soldiers in the West did understand the weapons’
12 lethality, in part because they had seen it first-hand in their skirmishes and battles
13 with the Sioux and their allies on the Plains. U.S. soldiers in the West at first
14 assumed that the Natives were getting the weapons legally from traders who were
15 operating with the approval of the U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs. That assumption
16 fueled long-standing hostility of the U.S. army toward the Bureau. The main
17 newspaper of the armed services of the time, the *Army and Navy Journal*, published
18 a satirical piece in 1867 pretending to be a Native American expressing gratitude to
19 the Bureau for allowing tribes to acquire single-shot guns and suggesting that the
20 Bureau might now “give us Spencer or Henry rifles.”³⁵

21 59. In fact, the Sioux and their allies did not get their Henrys (or
22 Winchesters) from the Bureau. Many of the weapons had been seized from
23 American emigrants and settlers whom the Natives had attacked. Many also had
24 been robbed from shippers heading to or through the Western Territories.

25 60. Here it is important to understand that no matter who might want a
26 Henry-Winchester, they were dependent on a successful shipping operation. The

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³⁵ *Army and Navy Journal*, June 1, 1867, p. 350.

1 weapons were manufactured in New Haven, Connecticut and shipped around the
2 country to U.S. ordnance depots, state arsenals, private gun stores, and, in rare
3 cases, individuals (individual mail-order did not become common until the 1890s,
4 and the first mail-order guns were shipped by Sears in the early 1900s).³⁶ There
5 was no U.S. parcel post until 1913; all shipping was done by private companies like
6 Wells Fargo. These companies divided up regions of the country, a legal
7 monopolistic practice, in order to maximize profits. In practical terms, this meant
8 that shipping costs were high, so buyers would be reluctant to ship goods that could
9 be lost. Loss was a very real possibility when it came to shipping weapons to
10 hostile areas. Shipping companies might use armed guards—some, as we have
11 seen, armed with Henrys or Winchesters—but the guards stood little chance against
12 an enemy that outnumbered them and was armed with the same type of guns. The
13 cost of the risk was passed from the manufacturers and “jobbers” who arranged for
14 sales to the consumers. The risk-induced increase in cost was a disincentive to
15 prospective individual or gun-store buyers in the West. This was one more factor
16 providing a disincentive not only to potential private buyers but to the U.S. army to
17 adopt Henry-Winchesters.

18 61. Whatever the root causes of the minimal proliferation of Winchesters
19 among non-Natives of the West, the result was that Natives were more likely to use
20 Winchesters than anyone else in the region. The most heavily armed Americans of
21 the region, those of the U.S. cavalry units assigned to the Western Territories, used
22 for the most part their army-issued single-shot Springfield rifles. Meanwhile, as a
23 U.S. Colonel noted, Winchesters and lower-capacity repeating rifles in the late
24 1860s transformed “the Plains Indian from an insignificant, scarcely dangerous
25 adversary into as magnificent a soldier as the world can show.”³⁷

26 ³⁶ Williamson, *Winchester*, 178.

27 ³⁷ Pekka Hämäläinen, *Lakota America: A New History of Indigenous Power*
28 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2019), 299. In the northwest part of

1 62. The truth of that observation was borne out at the Battle of Little Big
2 Horn in 1876. Famously, the U.S. army commanded by George Custer was wiped
3 out by the Plains Indians. Most of Custer's troops carried single-shot Springfield
4 rifles. The Native Americans carried a variety of weapons, many of which were
5 Winchesters.³⁸ One of Custer's underlings, Marcus Reno, wrote after the battle that
6 "the Indians had Winchester rifles and the column [of U.S. cavalry] made a large
7 target for them and they were pumping bullets into it."³⁹ Weaponry was not the sole
8 reason for Custer's defeat that day at the Little Big Horn. Still, it is worth noting
9 that "the gun that won the West" was in the hands of Native Americans, not U.S.
10 soldiers, at the most famous battle in the West of all time.

11 63. Humiliated by Custer's defeat, the U.S. army in the West still did not
12 choose to adopt Winchesters after Little Big Horn. However, an increasing number
13 of regiments in the West did act on their own to use ordnance funds to buy
14 Winchesters. Although the army did not officially adopt the Winchester, it did all it
15 could to keep the weapon, along with lower-capacity repeating rifles, out of the
16 hands of the Plains Indians. Right away after Custer's defeat the army banned
17 traders from trading any types of guns to any types of Natives, friendly or hostile.
18 U.S. officers sought to arrest traders who had been selling Winchesters to Plains
19 Indians against government policy.⁴⁰ Meanwhile, American civilians in the
20 Western Territories demanded that Canadian authorities also intervene to keep
21 Winchesters from Native Americans, specifically the Blackfoot.⁴¹

22 the Western Territories, the Nez Perce also were fond of Winchesters. Chief Joseph
23 usually kept one close at hand. See Jerome A. Greene, *Nez Perce Summer, 1877: The U.S. Army and the Nee-Me-Poo* (Helena: Montana Society Press, 2001), 34-42, 310-12.

24 ³⁸ Hämäläinen, *Lakota America*, 340.

25 ³⁹ Haag, *The Gunning of America*, 176-77.

26 ⁴⁰ *Chicago Daily Tribune*, July 23, 1876, p. 4.

27 ⁴¹ *Chicago Daily Tribune*, April 15, 1878, p. 4.

1 64. It is impossible to know all the reasons why the U.S. army did not
2 adopt Henrys or Winchesters before or even soon after Little Big Horn, but one
3 reason was the same one that had lingered on Americans' minds ever since the
4 Henry Rifle was introduced in the early 1860s: the fear that the weapon was as
5 dangerous to its user as it was to its intended target. The stories that manufacturers
6 had helped circulate early on from the West about the power of the rifle to allow
7 one person to defeat many failed to muster much enthusiasm for the weapon. It did
8 not help that some assessments from experts were negative. At a showcase of
9 firearms in Switzerland soon after the Civil War, a judge rendered the verdict that
10 the rifle seemed delicate and unnecessarily lethal—"more wonderful than
11 practical."⁴² Back in the U.S., skeptics worried that the rifle would fail at a crucial
12 moment or explode. When it came to Henrys and Winchesters, argued a writer for
13 the New York Herald, the most widely circulating newspaper in the country, the
14 "dangers are too many."⁴³

15 **C. Henrys and Winchesters in the Reconstruction-Era North**

16 65. The North was the region in the United States where Henrys and
17 Winchesters were hardest to find, either because they were deemed too dangerous
18 or because northerners already felt themselves well-armed. Recall that hundreds of
19 thousands of U.S. soldiers had returned home from the Civil War with rifles in
20 hand, almost all of the weapons Spencers or Sharps or Enfield, rarely Henrys.

21 66. The near-absence of Henry-Winchester rifles in the North became
22 clear during the "Great Strike" of 1877. The "Great Strike" began as a local labor
23 action in West Virginia and turned into a massive strike stretching from
24 Philadelphia to Chicago. Mob violence was prevalent. In this months-long
25 episode, during which thousands of Americans were injured and hundreds were

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⁴² Haag, *The Gunning of America*, 70.

28 ⁴³ "Breech-Loading Arms," *New York Herald*, Oct. 12, 1866, p. 4.

1 killed, there were only two incidents that I found involving Henrys or Winchesters.
2 In Chicago during the rioting, a U.S. soldier fired a Henry rifle in response to
3 civilians pelting his regiment with rocks. He may purposefully have avoided
4 shooting anyone—no one was hit. But the sound of the shot went a long way
5 toward quieting the crowd. The soldier in question was from a regiment that had
6 been assigned to the Western Territories but transferred temporarily to Chicago to
7 put down the unrest. That explained why he had a Henry. His regiment likely
8 acquired Henrys to fight Plains Indians; now he used the weapon—albeit
9 sparingly—to subdue strikers.⁴⁴ In Jackson County, Kansas, just north of Topeka,
10 railroad managers armed forty employees with Winchester rifles, ordering them to
11 scare off the local strikers. To give the gang the veneer of a legitimate posse, the
12 managers arranged for the local sheriff to deputize the gunmen. Violence ensued
13 when the “posse” confronted the strikers, and at least one of the strikers was killed,
14 though not necessarily by a Winchester.⁴⁵

15 67. In general, however, Henrys and Winchesters were rare to find among
16 northerners during Reconstruction. They were sometimes mentioned in ads
17 displayed in northern publications aimed at hunters and target-shooters. If the ads
18 were any indication of the target audience, the hoped-for buyers of the rifles were
19 elites—not the types who showed up during the mobbing of the Great Strike of
20 1877—and they were interested in peaceful shooting contests, not fending off
21 potential violent attackers.⁴⁶ Reports from state adjutant generals in the North
22 sometimes show Henrys and Winchesters in arsenal inventories, but these guns
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24 ⁴⁴ Robert V. Bruce, *1877: Year of Violence* (1959; repr., Chicago:
25 Quadrangle Books, 1970), 251-52.

26 ⁴⁵ “A Tough Customer,” *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, Oct. 1, 1877, p. 4.

27 ⁴⁶ See, for example, an ad for many types of guns, including “Henry’s
28 Sporting Rifle,” in Wilkes’ *Spirit of the Times: The American Gentleman’s
Newspaper*, March 24, 1866, p. 59 (the ad was reprinted in the same weekly
publication irregularly through June 16, 1866).

1 were always far outnumbered by the more popular rifles of the era in the region—
2 Sharps, Spencers and Springfields.

3 68. Beginning in about the mid-1870s, northerners became more interested
4 in owning Winchesters and modern rifles in general, not for purposes of self-
5 defense but for purposes of collective defense of their communities and states. This
6 was the period when National Guard units came into being, beginning in the
7 northern states. They were in effect state militias. The engine that drove their
8 creation was not a fear of tyranny or of insurrection but a nationalistic fervor fueled
9 in particular by the nation’s Centennial, which began to be celebrated in the early
10 1870s even before the major exhibitions and commemorations of 1876.⁴⁷ With the
11 rise of this movement came a perceived business opportunity for the Winchester
12 company, which began placing ads for their rifles in northern newspapers,
13 magazines, and gun catalogs. The greatest number of ads appeared in western
14 Pennsylvania.⁴⁸ The ads seem to have had some effect. A newspaper published in
15 northwestern Pennsylvania reported in October 1877 that “Winchester rifles are
16 becoming quite fashionable in this section, and are rapidly displacing the old
17 double-barreled rifles. . . . The Remington rifle is highly spoken of by those who
18 have used it, but it is not a repeater, or ‘stem-winder,’ and so the Winchester is
19 ahead.”⁴⁹

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22 ⁴⁷ Eleanor L. Hannah, “Manhood, Citizenship, and the Formation of the
23 National Guards, Illinois, 1870-1917” (Ph.D. diss, University of Chicago, 1997),
24 15-16. Hannah’s dissertation is crucial for countering the assumption, now rejected
25 by historians, that the rise of the National Guard movement in the northern states
26 was a reaction to events in the South of the 1870s or to the Great Strike of 1877.
See also, Saul Cornell, *A Well-Regulated Militia: The Founding Fathers and the
Origins of Gun Control in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006),
196-97.

27 ⁴⁸ See, for example, *James Bown and Son’s Illustrated Catalogue and Price
List*, 29th annual ed. (Pittsburgh, Penn., 1877), 33.

28 ⁴⁹ *The Forest Republican* (Tionesta, Pennsylvania), Oct. 3, 1877, p. 4.

1 69. The rise of National Guard units in northern states in the late 1870s
2 inspired private armed companies to form, drill, and parade. One of these groups
3 was the Lehr und Wehr Verein of Chicago, Illinois, led by the Socialist activist
4 Henry Presser. Presser's company paraded one day in the spring of 1879. They
5 carried rifles—not Winchesters but Springfields. Socialist sympathizers nearby
6 joined with the group, and Presser was arrested and tried for organizing a private
7 militia. His case ended up in the Supreme Court, which ruled in the Presser case in
8 1886 that the armed company's actions were indeed unlawful.

9 **D. Henrys and Winchesters in the Reconstruction-Era South**

10 70. In the South during Reconstruction, high-capacity firearms proliferated
11 far more than in any other region of the country. The reason for this proliferation is
12 clear: Winchester Repeating Rifles were the preferred weapon of two large state
13 militias, those of Louisiana and South Carolina, that were organized to put down
14 insurrection against state and national authority as well as terrorism against Black
15 Americans.

16 71. The story of the South Carolina state militia getting armed with
17 Winchesters begins with the inauguration of Robert K. Scott as the state's governor
18 in 1868. Scott, a white man, was a pro-Reconstruction Republican. He had been
19 born in Pennsylvania, he grew up in Ohio, and he became a high-ranking officer in
20 the U.S. army during the Civil War. After the war, he was an officer in the
21 Freedman's Bureau. As Governor of South Carolina, he endorsed and helped
22 arrange the creation of a pro-Republican state militia open to Black Americans and
23 pro-Republican whites.

24 72. The state act creating the state militia was adopted in 1868. The
25 militia was always a work-in-progress, so it is impossible to know exactly how
26 many men served in it at any given time. A reasonable estimate is that 1000 men
27 were in the militia by 1869. Scott hoped that the force would grow eventually to
28 6000. Although the militia was open to pro-Republican whites, most of the

1 members were Black Americans. The state did not have enough arms to supply the
2 men. In the summer of 1869, the state's adjutant general traveled to Washington,
3 D.C. to arrange with the U.S. War Department for an allotment of funds to pay for
4 arms for the state militia. This arrangement was a restoration of a policy that had
5 long been in place but had often fallen into disuse: the U.S. War Department would
6 pay each state an annual allotment to sustain its state militia. With the funds that
7 the South Carolina adjutant general received in mid-1869, he helped arrange the
8 purchase of hundreds of guns, both Winchesters and Springfields.⁵⁰

9 73. By August 1869, Winchesters had begun to arrive in South Carolina,
10 earmarked for members of the state militia. In the middle of that month, a company
11 of Black American state militiamen armed with Winchesters appeared at a wharf in
12 Charleston. The occasion was the arrival of a white baseball team from Savannah,
13 which was scheduled to play a white team in Charleston. A few days earlier, the
14 team had made the same trip. But when it arrived, Black American civilians had
15 decided to disrupt the match as a form of protest. They showed up on the streets,
16 got in the way of the white players as they made their way to the field, and hurled
17 insults. The team turned around and headed back to Savannah. This time, on
18 August 15, the Mayor of Charleston was prepared to make sure that things went
19 smoothly—though not in a way that whites in the city would approve of. He had
20 given the order for the company of black state militiamen to arrive at the wharf and
21 escort the Savannah baseball team to the playing fields. The game took place. But
22 white Democrats in the city as well as the rest of the state (and throughout the
23 whole of the former Confederacy) were furious.⁵¹ Meanwhile, Black Americans

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⁵⁰ Richard Zuczek, *State of Rebellion: Reconstruction in South Carolina*
27 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1996), 75; Singletary, *Negro
Militia and Reconstruction*, 20-21.

28 ⁵¹ *Washington Evening Star*, Aug. 16, 1869, p. 1.

1 throughout the state celebrated the role that members of their race would play in the
2 keeping of the peace.

3 74. From late 1869 to early 1871, companies of black state militiamen
4 armed with Winchesters appeared regularly across South Carolina. At first,
5 Governor Scott was thrilled with the organization. On March 29, 1870, he
6 delivered a speech that extolled the Black-American dominated militia as the best
7 way to ensure that peace would return to the state and that future elections would be
8 fairly held. He particularly recommended that state militias be armed with
9 Winchesters. He had seen first-hand how these weapons intimidated potentially
10 violent protesters even without being fired. His neighboring state of Georgia
11 should have such a militia staffed with blacks and armed with Winchesters, Scott
12 advised. “I tell you the Winchester rifle is the best law that you can have there,” he
13 declared. Georgia, one of the states that had had its pro-Democrat, anti-black
14 militia dissolved by Congress in 1867, never did create a new militia. Scott knew
15 that it wouldn’t. His speech was meant to announce not only to South Carolina but
16 to neighboring states that the old ways of the Confederacy were gone for good.
17 Members of the opposition to Scott and the Republicans in South Carolina became
18 furious. Many called him “Winchester Scott” and bewailed “Scott’s Winchester
19 Rifle tactics.”⁵²

20 75. During the election season of 1870, Scott decided that he had erred.
21 Opposition papers regularly reprinted his “Winchester” speech and attacked Scott
22 as a tyrant trying to stir up a race war. Much more troubling was the fact that state
23 chapters of the Ku Klux Klan began plotting a response to Scott’s speech and the
24 existence of the militia.

25 76. The Klan had decided to meet Winchesters with Winchesters. They
26 sent agents to the North to buy crates of Winchesters and ship them to South

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28 ⁵² See, for example, *Charleston News*, Oct. 17, 1870, p. 2.

1 Carolina in crates with false labels (“Agricultural Implements” said one; “Dry
2 Goods” said another). The state militia and the U.S. army were able to intercept
3 some of the crates, but others arrived at their destination. The Klan and auxiliary
4 white supremacist groups distributed the weapons to Scott’s opponents in towns
5 across the state.⁵³ Violence broke out across the state. That was a regular
6 occurrence during election season, but this time the lethality was more severe than
7 usual. Both sides had Winchesters.

8 77. With the help of the intervention of the U.S. army and his own state
9 militia, Scott was able to win re-election in 1870. Almost immediately he tried to
10 draw down the violence in the state by attempting to remove Winchesters from the
11 population. Aided by U.S. army units, his administration attempted to confiscate as
12 many Winchesters as they could from insurrectionary groups like the Klan. Then
13 he asked those state militiamen who were holding onto their Winchesters instead of
14 storing them in state arsenals to turn the weapons in. Some Winchesters did end up
15 coming back into state arsenals, either by way of confiscation from Klansmen or
16 voluntary submissions by militiamen. But most of the Winchesters stayed in
17 circulation. Scott suspended the state militia.

18 78. In early 1874, South Carolina was again the site of violent uprisings
19 from insurrectionists, and the pro-Republican government responded by re-forming
20 the state militia. The adjutant general of the state reported that he barely had any
21 guns for the men. In fact, a report he had issued the year before declared that there
22 were 627 Winchesters in state arsenals. Probably the official was worried that
23 widespread arming of Black Americans and white Republicans with Winchesters
24 would create a mini-civil war like the one in 1870.⁵⁴ The re-activated state militia

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27 ⁵³ Zuczek, *State of Rebellion*, 79-80.
28 ⁵⁴ Ibid., 140-41.

1 was poorly organized and poorly armed. For armed support between 1874 and
2 1876, the Republican administration of the state relied mostly on the U.S. army.

3 79. Then, in 1876, came the final battles between pro-Republican, U.S.-
4 authorized armed men (the U.S. army units and state militia) and the
5 insurrectionary opposition forces, the “Red Shirts.” Of the many reasons that the
6 opposition forces could be categorized as insurrectionary, perhaps the most obvious
7 was that they regularly stole weapons, including Winchesters, from state arsenals.⁵⁵
8 When the voting in 1876 was over, the two sides in the struggle each declared
9 victory. Two governors then existed, and since no one was going to accept a
10 resolution of the crisis by law, the state was in political chaos, with armed groups
11 on each side ready to go to battle. When companies of armed men marched for
12 their respective candidates, plenty of them carried Winchesters. Only some of
13 those Winchesters had been obtained legally. Those carried by the “Red Shirts”
14 had almost certainly been stolen from state depots.

15 80. The Louisiana state militia was created in 1870. The story of how
16 Louisiana state militiamen ended up armed with Winchesters starts before the
17 organization was created. In 1868, the New Orleans metropolitan police force was
18 re-organized under Republican leadership. It now used “Metropolitans” as its
19 nickname. Its members included Black Americans as well as whites of varying
20 ethnicities, the city being one of the most ethnically diverse in the country. The
21 number of Metropolitans in 1868 was small—perhaps just over 100—but by 1870
22 that number was close to 700. During its earliest years, from 1868 to 1870, the
23 Metropolitans’ superintendent, A. S. Badger, armed many of the men with
24 Winchesters. In 1870, Governor Henry Warmoth engineered the creation of the
25 state militia. Warmoth envisioned a state militia that would be composed of 2,500
26 Black Americans and 2,500 white former Confederates. The Confederates, in

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⁵⁵ Ibid., 171.

1 theory, would be loyal to the United States and thus supportive of Reconstruction
2 programs created by Republicans. Anyone could see that the two sides of this force
3 would not fit together easily. To help foster something approaching unity across
4 the state militia, Warmoth appointed James Longstreet, a former Confederate
5 General, as head of the state militia. As part of the act creating the state militia, the
6 New Orleans Metropolitans were incorporated into the state militia. The
7 Metropolitans after 1870 were thus both an urban police force and a company of
8 state militiamen. In this latter role, they were authorized to operate outside of city
9 limits. The Metropolitans were the best-trained unit in the state militia. Because
10 many of their number carried Winchesters, they were also the best armed.⁵⁶

11 81. Between 1870 and 1874, politics in Louisiana was multifaceted and
12 ever-shifting. Warmoth regularly changed his political stances, outside blocs
13 suddenly gained inside influence, and through it all, pro-Democratic factions,
14 supported by armed “White Leagues,” tried to resurrect the Old South on the soil of
15 Louisiana. In 1872, William Kellogg won the governorship. Kellogg was a
16 Republican, one more radical than Warmoth and more in line with the Republicans
17 in the U.S. Congress. Warmoth in 1872 had sided with John McEnery, a former
18 Confederate, an anti-Reconstruction Democrat, and a leading voice for state
19 redemption.

20 82. The state militia, composed of a group loyal to the Warmoth-McEnery
21 faction and a group loyal to Kellogg, was rendered ineffective after 1872 by its lack
22 of cohesion. Individual units within the state militia were nonetheless important, as
23 they were the only legitimate state-level armed forces. Of these units, the
24 Metropolitans remained the most effective and best armed, as they still carried
25 Winchesters, whereas most of the other units did not. In politics, whoever

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27 ⁵⁶ Dennis C. Rousey, *Policing the Southern City: New Orleans, 1805-1889*
28 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1996), 130-31; Singletary, *Negro
Militia and Reconstruction*, 69-70.

1 controlled the Winchester-armed Metropolitans would always have an advantage
2 because, as Governor Scott of South Carolina had said in 1870, “the Winchester
3 rifle is the best law that you can have.” By late April 1873, William Kellogg, the
4 newly elected Governor, had established control of the Metropolitans.
5 Unfortunately, he had established that control too late to use the Metropolitans to
6 help avert the worst racial massacre that the state had ever seen, probably the worst
7 racial massacre of Reconstruction: the Colfax Massacre of April 13, 1873.

83. The tragedy of the Colfax Massacre has been the subject of much
9 historical study, but never from the perspective of a Winchester Repeating Rifle.
10 The combatants at Colfax, in Grant Parish, about 200 miles northwest of New
11 Orleans, consisted of one legitimate armed force and one illegitimate one. The
12 legitimate armed force was a unit of the state militia led by William Ward, a Black
13 American who had fought for the U.S. during the Civil War. More than 100 of
14 Ward’s men, perhaps more than 150, would be murdered at Colfax. The
15 illegitimate armed force was a “posse” deputized by two local men, one who
16 claimed to be a judge and one who claimed to be a sheriff. In fact, as all in the
17 “posse” knew, the so-called judge and so-called sheriff had held those positions
18 under the former governor, not under the current governor, who had denied them
19 commissions that would have kept them in office. The claim of the “judge” and
20 “sheriff” was that the former governor had in fact won the 1872 election and thus
21 that they held their positions legitimately. (Election-result denial is not a new
22 phenomenon; it was rampant in the South during Reconstruction.) Years later,
23 when the Colfax episode came before the U.S. Supreme Court in the form of the
24 *Cruikshank* case, Justice Bradley, author of the controlling opinion, declared that
25 leaders of the so-called posse were private citizens, not state officers. Bradley was
26 technically right. But at the time of the Colfax Massacre, the lead murderers had
27 donned masks of state-legitimated authority. Neither the legitimate nor the
28

1 illegitimate side at Colfax carried Winchesters. But if William Ward had had his
2 way, his side would have had them.

3 84. Two days before the massacre, Ward had left Colfax for New Orleans.
4 He knew that violence might erupt in Colfax, and he wanted to persuade Governor
5 Kellogg to send military support. Almost certainly, Ward was going to ask Kellogg
6 to send the Winchester-armed Metropolitans. Ward never made it to New Orleans.
7 Even if he had, the Metropolitans could not have made it to Colfax in time to stop
8 the massacre. They might not have been willing to go—it would be another ten
9 days beyond the massacre before their loyalty to Kellogg was cemented. The
10 important point amid all these hypotheticals is this: William Ward believed that a
11 cadre carrying Winchesters was the best chance his men had.

12 85. By October 1873, the Metropolitans had pledged their loyalty to
13 Kellogg, and Kellogg had helped secure for them and other state militia units
14 hundreds of new Winchesters. Kellogg dispatched the Metropolitans to Grant
15 Parish, the site of the Colfax Massacre, to reestablish control of the area for the
16 Republicans. They and their Winchesters arrived at the end of the month—more
17 than 25 weeks after William Ward had hoped they would come.⁵⁷

18 86. The power of the Metropolitans, along with their Winchesters, would
19 soon stripped away. Opponents of Kellogg gained control of the Metropolitans'
20 Board by early 1864. They reduced the numbers of the force and limited their
21 geographical range to New Orleans and its outskirts. If violence broke out in a
22 rural area like Grant Parish, there would be nothing that the Metropolitans could do
23 about it. Then, on September 14, 1874, came the final blow: the Battle of Liberty
24 Place, fought in the heart of New Orleans. Thousands of White Leaguers launched
25 a coordinated attack on the city. Some of them may have been carrying
26 Winchesters, but none of the reports from that day mentioned Winchesters in their

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⁵⁷ *New Orleans Republican*, June 13, 1873, p. 1; *Ouachita Telegraph*,
28 October 24, 1873, p 1.

1 hands. The Metropolitans had Winchesters, of course, but they were outnumbered
2 more than 10 to 1 and easily overwhelmed. After the White Leaguers had
3 demonstrated their superior force, Governor Kellogg knew that he might soon be
4 removed, so he engineered a compromise that kept him in office. Part of the deal
5 was the disbandment of the state militia. Thus ended the prospect of a reign-by-
6 Winchester Republican regime in Louisiana.⁵⁸

7 87. In the brief time that Winchesters were in the hands of southern state
8 militias, the rifles showed that they could do much to intimidate the forces of white
9 supremacy and insurrection. But there was a dark flip side to the positive quality of
10 this particular high-capacity firearm.

11 88. Those opposed to the state militias and to Reconstruction in general
12 used the presence of Winchesters in state militias as fodder to attack all
13 Republicans and especially Black Americans. At a rally in April 1870, a Georgia
14 Black-American leader, Simeon Beard, pleaded for more guns so blacks could have
15 their own militia rather than relying on the U.S. army. “We don’t want soldiers; we
16 want the power to raise a militia; we want guns put in our hands, and we will see
17 whether we cannot protect ourselves. Give us this, and we will give you the State
18 of Georgia evermore.” In response, a redeemer newspaper editor mocked Black
19 Americans like Beard who clamored “lustily for arms,” including “Winchester
20 rifles.” The redeemer editor then brought up the South Carolina experiment with
21 Winchester-armed state militias as evidence that the lives of ordinary white people
22 were in grave danger. “There are thousands of white people in this State who have
23 no arms at all, not even a pistol, while there is not one negro in three who does not
24 own some sort of firearm. They are armed now-fully armed. It is the white people
25 who need arms, not the negroes.”⁵⁹

26 ⁵⁸ Rousey, *Policing the Southern City*, 155-56.
27 ⁵⁹ *Georgia Weekly Telegraph and Georgia Journal & Messenger*, April 5,
28 1870, pp. 4, 8.

1 89. The Winchester was as much a symbolic weapon as a real one in the
2 battles between Republicans and Redeemers in the Reconstruction-era southern
3 states. Republicans saw the gun as the emblem of power—the sign that the cause
4 of Reconstruction had a strong, locally controlled force behind it. The Redeemers
5 saw the gun as evidence of the Republicans' tyranny and barbarity. In Texas,
6 Democrats opposed to Reconstruction howled that there must be “no money, no
7 Winchester rifles and ammunition” for Republicans—this despite the fact that
8 Republicans in the state had never suggested arming themselves with
9 Winchesters.⁶⁰

10 90. In terms of real as opposed to imagined Winchesters, even though the
11 weapons in Louisiana and South Carolina were housed under guarded armories,
12 they could still end up in the hands of insurrectionaries or criminals. In Louisiana,
13 as in all the states of Reconstruction, there were internal, often violent conflicts
14 over the control of the state government. By various means, from outright theft to
15 the legitimate winning of a state election, the opposition to a Republican
16 government in a state like Louisiana could gain access to Winchesters. Once these
17 weapons were in the hands of insurrectionary groups, they could end up with
18 anyone, including an outlaw with no particular political persuasion. That is
19 probably how a Winchester ended up among a large cache of arms held by the
20 husband-wife team known as the Guillorys, a pair of marauding thieves who went
21 on a rampage near Opelousas, Louisiana in the late summer of 1873. When a posse
22 caught up with them, it easily dispatched the couple, killing the husband and
23 seriously wounding the wife.⁶¹

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25 ⁶⁰ *The Weekly Democratic Statesman* (Austin, Texas), August 24, 1871, p. 2.

26 ⁶¹ “Another Battle,” *The Opelousas Journal*, Aug. 29, 1873, p. 3. A side note
27 to the episode: No one in the posse had a Winchester, and the Guillorys in the
28 exchange of gunfire opted not to use their Winchester, only their low-capacity rifles
and shotguns.

1 91. By 1874, all of the state militias had been disbanded. Redeemers—
2 those in each state wanting state redemption from Reconstruction—had been
3 against the state militias from the start and were glad to see them go. By the end of
4 Reconstruction, all of the southern states had reverted to their pre-1867 militia
5 system, 1867 being the year that the U.S. Congress abolished all southern militias
6 except those in Arkansas and Tennessee.⁶² Under the renewed militia system,
7 volunteer militias could form on their own with the explicit or implicit approval of
8 state governors. Because most of the southern state governments after 1874 were
9 ruled by pro-redemption Democrats, most of the militias that formed after 1874
10 were of the sort that would have been considered insurrectionary by pro-
11 Reconstruction Republicans in the states as well as by the Congressional
12 Republicans who had abolished such militias in 1867.

13 92. The three states that were not controlled by Redeemers after 1874 were
14 Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina. In Louisiana and South Carolina, the 1876
15 state elections were disputed (so, too, quite famously, was the national election of
16 1876). In both states, as a result, the two contending sides, pro-redemption
17 Democrats and pro-Reconstruction Republicans, claimed victory and claimed that
18 their gubernatorial candidate was the legitimate governor of the state. In each of
19 these states, therefore, there were two governors. Meanwhile, in Florida, there was
20 no dispute over the governor's office, but there was conflict nonetheless because

21 ⁶² The Texas Rangers claimed to be a state militia loyal to the U.S. right up
22 until it was disbanded in 1877, but by 1874, if not earlier, the group was clearly on
23 the side of the Democrats in the state. A number of Democrats in 1877 pleaded
24 with the state government not to disband the Rangers. One wealthy Democrat in
25 1877 even offered the state government a voluntary donation of Winchesters for the
26 state militia (the militia had not used Winchesters prior to that point). The state
27 government rejected the offer and disbanded the militia. See Robert M. Utley,
Lone Star Justice: The First Century of the Texas Rangers (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002), 169-70; Walter Prescott Webb, *The Texas Rangers: A
Century of Frontier Defense* (1935; 2nd ed., Austin: University of Texas Press,
1965), 292-93.

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1 the electoral board of the state was controlled by pro-Reconstruction Republicans
2 while the rest of the state government was controlled by pro-redemption
3 Democrats.⁶³ As a result of the internal conflicts within Florida, Louisiana, and
4 South Carolina, the U.S. army dispatched troops to the capitals of each state. The
5 troops were intended to “keep the peace” in all the states, to ensure that the pro-
6 Reconstruction Republican governors of Louisiana and South Carolina were
7 accepted as the only legitimate governors of the states, and to protect the Florida
8 electoral board from being disbanded by pro-redemption Democrats.

9 93. The circumstances described above had important consequences for
10 who came to possess Henrys and Winchesters by the end of Reconstruction. In
11 Louisiana and South Carolina prior to 1874, these high-capacity firearms were
12 possessed and regulated by pro-Reconstruction Republicans, who possessed them
13 specifically for the purpose of state defense against armed insurrectionaries allied
14 with pro-redemption Democrats. Once pro-redemption Democrats in these states
15 after 1874 claimed that their “governor” was the only legitimate governor of the
16 state—a position supported by most whites in each state—the “governor” in
17 question used his alleged authority to distribute Winchesters held in state armories
18 to pro-redemption volunteer militia groups. In Louisiana, the pro-redemption
19 groups known as White Leaguers in 1876-77 marched through the streets of New
20 Orleans demanding that their “governor,” Francis T. Nicholls, be recognized as the
21 sole governor of the state. At least 500 of the White Leaguers, but probably
22 hundreds more, carried Winchester rifles.⁶⁴ According to a Black American who
23 later testified about events in New Orleans at the time, some of the White Leaguers
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⁶³ Jerrell H. Shofner, “Florida Courts and the Disputed Election of 1876,”
26 *Florida Historical Quarterly*, 48 (July 1969), 26-46.

27 ⁶⁴ *Chicago Daily Inter Ocean*, January 12, 1877, p. 2; *New Orleans*
28 *Republican*, March 13, 1877, p. 2.

1 not only paraded with their Winchesters but also wore their old Confederate
2 uniforms.⁶⁵ The U.S. army regarded these marchers as insurrectionaries.

3 94. A similar situation played out in South Carolina, though there, the pro-
4 redemption Democrats were known as Red Shirts. Beginning in 1874 and
5 continuing through 1876, South Carolina Red Shirts created volunteer militias that
6 obtained Winchesters from pro-redemption authorities in the state government.
7 There were many Winchesters to be had in that state, as the pro-Reconstruction
8 Governor Robert “Winchester” Scott back in 1869-1870 had purportedly ordered
9 thousands of them. The exact number that Scott had acquired remains in dispute.⁶⁶
10 Whatever the number was, it seems that only a few hundred ended up in the hands
11 of Red Shirts in the 1874-76 period, though that was still a few hundred more than
12 Republicans of the era thought was legal.⁶⁷

13 95. Despite these developments, the total number of Henrys and
14 Winchesters in the southern states during Reconstruction remained small relative to
15 firearms in general in the country—no more than 8,000, I would estimate.⁶⁸

16 ⁶⁵ Testimony of William Murrell, *Report and Testimony of the Select*
17 *Committee to Investigate the Causes of the Removal of the Negroes from the*
18 *Southern States to the Northern States* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1880), pt. 2, p. 521.

19 ⁶⁶ During the U.S. Congressional investigations into Klan activities,
20 investigators tried to ascertain how many Winchesters had actually arrived in South
21 Carolina for Scott’s militia; they failed to learn what the number was, though one
22 witness did confirm that the Winchesters that did arrive there were intended for the
23 state militia, including the African Americans among them. See 42nd Cong., 2nd
24 sess., “Affairs in Insurrectionary States,” vol. 3 (South Carolina), *U.S.*
Congressional Serial Set (1871), p. 467; and *ibid.*, vol. 4 (South Carolina,), p. 767.

25 ⁶⁷ Zuczek, *State of Rebellion*, 140-41, 170-71 (some of the Winchesters were
26 referred to as “militia guns”; see *ibid.*, 171).

27 ⁶⁸ This estimate is based on the assumption that all 6,000 Winchesters that
28 Governor Scott ordered for the South Carolina state militia were delivered (the
exact number delivered is unknown, and most likely it is lower). When this number
is combined with the roughly 1,000 Winchesters used to arm the Metropolitans in
Louisiana over a six-year period, along with perhaps another 1,000 stolen from U.S.
army depots, the sum is 8,000.

1 Equally important, almost all of these high-capacity firearms were in the hands of
2 law enforcement officers, either U.S. soldiers, pro-Reconstruction militias, or pro-
3 Redemption militias. These last set of armed bodies were illegitimate, to be sure—
4 chapters of the KKK were among them—but, importantly, even they regarded it
5 essential to claim that it was their status as militiamen, and only that status, that
6 legitimized their possession of high-capacity firearms.

7 96. With only a few exceptions (fewer than five), all reliable reports in
8 which Henrys or Winchesters were mentioned in accessible records from the
9 Reconstruction South indicate that they were regarded solely as firearms for
10 legitimate law enforcement officers.⁶⁹ An example of an exception comes from
11 Marianna, Florida in September 1869. There, a group of about twenty-five Black
12 Americans, including women and children, were having a barbecue. From the
13 woods nearby an unseen assailant fired “thirteen or fourteen shots in rapid
14 succession,” killing and wounding many of the party. The U.S. officer who later
15 reported on the episode assumed that the assailant had used a Henry rifle because of
16 the speed and volume of the shots fired. He wrote to his superior asking for a
17 “first-class detective” to be sent to the town to investigate who the perpetrator or
18 perpetrators might be. “If detectives can’t be furnished,” he added, “a few Henry
19 rifles would have an excellent moral effect here.”⁷⁰

20 97. At least some state-level law enforcement officials outside of
21 Louisiana and South Carolina ended up with Henrys or Winchesters. A pro-
22 Republican jailer in a sheriff’s office in Alabama was able to use a Winchester to

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25 ⁶⁹ This Report does not accept as evidence second- or third-hand rumors of
26 Henrys or Winchesters being present, though even such rumors prior to 1870 were
27 infrequent.

28 ⁷⁰ J. Q. Dickinson to “Hamilton,” in 42nd Cong., 2nd sess., “Affairs in
Insurrectionary States,” vol. 13 (Florida), *U.S. Congressional Serial Set* (1871), pp.
289-90.

1 fend off attacking Klansmen in January 1871.⁷¹ In 1873, a dozen men in
2 southwestern Texas deputized to fight Native Americans near the Mexican border
3 were successful in subduing the Natives and, in reward, were presented by the state
4 legislature with Winchester rifles (they had not used Winchesters to fight the
5 Natives, though the Natives that they fought might well have used Winchesters).⁷²
6 The most revealing example comes from 1875 Mississippi, in the testimony of
7 Sheriff John Milton Brown of Coahoma. Brown was the first Black American
8 sheriff anywhere in Mississippi. He reported that Black Americans in his region
9 had no guns and implied that they had been ordered to turn in their arms to the
10 white insurrectionaries who controlled most of the state. Brown, though, had not
11 turned in any weapons because he believed that his position as sheriff allowed him
12 to keep his weapons. As he told an investigator, he had “one Henry rifle” and he
13 thought that he “was justified in having that, because I was sheriff.”⁷³

14 98. Americans have long disputed and no doubt will continue to dispute
15 the meaning, implications, and correctness of the U.S. Supreme Court’s two earliest
16 “Second Amendment” opinions, which were offered during or soon after
17 Reconstruction: *U.S. v. Cruikshank* and *Presser v. Illinois*.⁷⁴ But one issue
18 regarding those cases is beyond dispute: they did not involve high-capacity
19 firearms. There were no Henrys or Winchesters at Colfax on the tragic day of the
20 massacre there in 1873. There were none in the hands of the military companies
21

22 ⁷¹ 42nd Cong., 2nd sess., “Affairs in Insurrectionary States,” vol. 8 (Alabama),
23 *U.S. Congressional Serial Set* (1871), pp. 414-15.

24 ⁷² *Texas Session Laws*, 13th Legislature, Regular Session, General Laws,
chap. 187 (March 28, 1873), pp. 225-26.

25 ⁷³ 46th Cong., 2nd sess., S. Rep. 693, pt. 2 “Investigation of Causes of
26 Migration of Negroes from Southern to Northern States,” *U.S. Congressional Serial
Set* (1879-88), 357.

27 ⁷⁴ *U.S. v. Cruikshank*, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); *Presser v. Illinois*, 116 U.S. 252
28 (1886).

1 that marched on that spring day in Chicago in 1879—the episode that would lead to
2 the 1886 Presser decision (Presser’s men carried single-shot Remington rifles).⁷⁵
3 On the question of whether the law could treat high-capacity firearms differently
4 from other types of weapons, the Reconstruction-era Justices had nothing to say.
5 But the land they lived in, the land they ruled over, was one where high-capacity
6 firearms were held only by a select few, almost all of whom were U.S. soldiers or
7 civilian law enforcement officers sworn to uphold the U.S. government. These
8 gunmen held their distinctive weapons not to defend themselves as individuals from
9 imagined foes but to defend their state and country against all-too-real criminals
10 and insurrectionaries.

11 99. Many of these gunmen were Black Americans, specifically the Black
12 American men who made up the largest contingents of southern state militias.
13 Serving in these militias was one of many ways that Black Americans demonstrated
14 their gun-bearing rights. Other ways that this right was demonstrated are well
15 known to scholars: Black Americans helped make sure that the U.S. government
16 and state authorities overturned white supremacist efforts to ban blacks from
17 militias, deny them access to firearms, or seize their firearms (these efforts had been
18 embodied in the southern state Black Codes of 1865-67, which were overturned by
19 the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment of 1868). It is worth
20 noting, though, that a Black American who carried a Winchester for a state militia
21 was different from the much larger population of Black Americans who did not
22 belong to state militias. The Winchester-toting black militiaman held his gun only
23 with the authorization of and regulation by the state government. He did not own
24 his gun. It belonged to the state. It was supposed to be in an armory, not at a
25 private home, when not in militia-use. Hypothetically, if Black Americans wanted
26 Henrys or Winchesters at their homes, they might lawfully have been allowed to

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⁷⁵ “The Reds,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, March 23, 1879, p. 7.

1 have them there. But this hypothetical scenario is irrelevant. Southern Black
2 Americans for the most part lacked the means to buy Winchesters. Mostly rural
3 workers, their wages were notoriously low—sometimes only in the form of shares
4 of crops—and they would not be inclined to spend \$30 to \$40 on a gun that would
5 represent perhaps 3 to 6 months wages. There was no necessity for them to do so:
6 perfectly adequate guns for individual self-defense, even some “repeaters,” would
7 have been in their price range.

8 100. The Fourteenth Amendment assured Black Americans that they
9 possess firearms for self-defense but did not assure them that they could possess
10 any firearm they wanted, including a high-capacity rifle. This same principle of the
11 Amendment held equally true for whites.

12 101. Americans in the Reconstruction-era South understood perhaps better
13 than anyone that Henrys and Winchesters were weapons for organized military use
14 that did not belong in the general population. Except for a small number of
15 insurrectionary militias, like the Ku Klux Klan, the enemies of the Republican state
16 administrations in Louisiana and South Carolina that armed their state militias with
17 high-capacity firearms did not respond by trying to obtain the same weapons for
18 themselves. Rather, they responded by demanding the removal of the weapons and
19 the organizations that carried them. When these opposition factions came into
20 power in 1877, they disbanded the state militias and warehoused the Winchesters.
21 To be sure, they maintained laws that allowed citizens to possess firearms for their
22 individual self-defense, but they did not view high-capacity firearms as appropriate
23 for such a purpose.

24 102. My examination of statutes and state-level court opinions from the
25 Reconstruction-era South revealed that firearms were sometimes mentioned as
26 weapons of individual self-defense, but in such instances, the types of firearms

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1 mentioned were, with one exception, low-capacity firearms such as pistols,
2 revolvers, muskets, and rifles.⁷⁶

3 103. The one potential exception comes from a Tennessee state court
4 opinion of 1871, *Andrews v. State*. The court in *Andrews* ruled that among the
5 weapons a citizen might possess were rifles “of all descriptions,” including “the
6 shot gun, the musket, and repeater.”⁷⁷ This opinion has been cited by at least one
7 scholar as evidence that high-capacity firearms were understood to be possible
8 weapons of individual self-defense.⁷⁸ Yet, a “repeater” at the time of the *Andrews*
9 opinion (1871), and during the whole of Reconstruction, would have been
10 understood to be a low-capacity repeating rifle, such as a Spencer or Sharps, neither
11 of which could hold more than ten rounds. The parlance of the day put Henrys and
12 Winchesters in a separate category from “repeaters.” Again and again during
13 Reconstruction, from the Western Territories to the northern and southern states,
14 when a cache of firearms was described, Henrys and Winchesters, though obviously
15 repeating rifles, were always listed separately from “repeaters.” Furthermore, the
16 firearms mentioned in Judge Thomas J. Freeman’s majority opinion in *Andrews*—
17 shotguns, muskets, repeaters—were mentioned exclusively in terms of what a
18 person might possess in his role as a member of the militia. The chief judge of the
19 court, Alfred O. P. Nicholson, joined in that opinion. There was one judge on the
20 court, though, who believed that the *Andrews* opinion should go further—that it
21 should allow individuals to possess any weapon, regardless of what the militias in
22 the state did or did not possess. That judge, Thomas A. R. Nelson, expressed his

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⁷⁶ The survey that I conducted was of all state statutes and state-level cases in
24 the period 1863-1877 from the South relating to regulation of weapons. A list of
25 state-level cases from all states appears at <https://guncite.com/court/state/> (accessed
September 25, 2022).

26 ⁷⁷ *Andrews v. State*, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 179 (1871).

27 ⁷⁸ See, for example, Kopel, “The Second Amendment in the 19th Century,”
1418-21.

1 view in a concurring opinion, which he alone signed. The opinion did not mention
2 Henrys or Winchesters as weapons that he thought that any individual might
3 possess.⁷⁹

4 104. Even more revealing evidence for Reconstruction-era officials
5 believing that high-capacity firearms should be regulated comes from Louisiana.
6 Of the states that had militias that carried Henrys or Winchesters, Louisiana was the
7 only one that left behind a readily accessible record of how these high-capacity
8 firearms were to be managed by state authorities. All arms for the state militia were
9 overseen by the state adjutant general, James Longstreet. A former Confederate
10 General who joined the Louisiana Republican Party after the Civil War—a move
11 that forever marked him as a turncoat by his former Confederate comrades—
12 Longstreet well understood the ongoing insurrectionary intentions of former
13 Confederates in his state and elsewhere. He thought it crucial to ensure that such
14 men did not end up with Winchesters, and that they be incited as little as possible
15 by the sight of Winchesters being carried in public by their organized enemies,
16 Black-American militiamen foremost among them. For these reasons, he took
17 extraordinary precautions concerning the Winchesters that were held in the New
18 Orleans armory. His orders for the armory began with typical provisions such as
19 putting guards around the building and making sure that all guns inside were racked
20 when not in authorized use. Then, in the last provision of his orders, he turned
21 specifically to Winchesters. They were not to “be taken to pieces, or any part of
22 [them] removed . . . unless authorized by the Division Commander.” The
23 Winchesters were also not to be used for “parade or drill upon the streets or public
24 highways” without the Division Commander’s authority. Such restrictions were
25 not put on the other weapons in the arsenal; they were only for the Winchesters.⁸⁰

26 ⁷⁹ *Andrews v. State*, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 193-200 (1871).

27 ⁸⁰ Adjutant General James Longstreet, General Orders No. 16, New Orleans,
28 July 19, 1870, in *Annual Report of the Adjutant General of the State of Louisiana*,

1 **VI. CONCLUSION. RECONSTRUCTION AND TODAY: CONTINUITY AND**
2 **CHANGE**

3 105. How does the situation surrounding high-capacity firearms today
4 compare to the Reconstruction era? High-capacity firearms are still being sold
5 under the name Winchester, by companies such as Browning, but the Winchester
6 Repeating Rifle Company ceased to exist long ago. Of course, high-capacity
7 firearms can be found under plenty of other names today. But whereas today the
8 owners of such firearms might be civilians, in the Reconstruction era they would be
9 almost exclusively soldiers or law enforcement officers. There were civilians
10 during Reconstruction who owned high-capacity rifles, to be sure. Yet almost all
11 such civilians were “frontiersmen” of the Western Territories, and the population of
12 the Western Territories was tiny compared to the population of the United States as
13 a whole. Furthermore, Henrys and Winchesters, the only high-capacity firearms of
14 the era, were not the preferred firearms of the “frontiersmen” of the region.

15 106. By far the largest population possessing Henrys and Winchesters
16 during Reconstruction were members of state-wide militias. These organizations
17 no longer exist under their Reconstruction name of “state militias.” They evolved
18 into the National Guard, a term first used in place of “state militias” in the North in
19 the 1880s but ultimately applied to all state-level forces that were auxiliary to the
20 U.S. army, including those in the South. National Guard units today are not
21 analogues to the Reconstruction-era state militias; they are direct descendants.⁸¹
22 And they operate in exactly the same way. They are under the command of state
23 governors but can be used as auxiliary forces of the U.S. army—that is, they can be

25 for the Year Ending December 31, 1870 (New Orleans, A.L. Lee, 1871), p. 39.

26 ⁸¹ Saul Cornell, *A Well-Regulated Militia: The Founding Fathers and the*
27 *Origins of Gun Control in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006),
196-97.

1 “federalized.”⁸² Membership in the National Guard, like membership in the
2 Reconstruction-era state militias, is regulated. National Guard units, like
3 Reconstruction-era state militias, are expected to have proficiency with the weapons
4 they use and to have unfailing allegiance to the recognized governments of their
5 state and nation. Their access to high-capacity firearms is regulated. Such weapons
6 are typically kept under guard in a central location, such as an armory, and
7 dispensed to their users only for purposes of drilling, training, or actual use on those
8 occasions when National Guard units are called out. Beside today’s National
9 Guard, other users of high-capacity firearms at present include civilian law
10 enforcement officers. As this Report has shown, the analogs of such officials
11 during the Reconstruction era—urban policemen, sheriffs, or U.S. marshals—also
12 were known on occasion to carry high-capacity firearms.

13 107. What is distinctly different today compared to Reconstruction is the
14 ownership of high-capacity firearms by Americans who have no connection to the
15 military or law enforcement. If such owners along with their weapons were
16 transported by a time machine back to the Reconstruction-era South, they would
17 find themselves suspected of being outlaws by law enforcement officers. If they
18 then gathered together into organized companies, they would be considered
19 insurrectionary militias, which is precisely how the Ku Klux Klan was regarded
20

21 ⁸² The statutory language that enabled Abraham Lincoln to call up state
22 militias in 1861, which was then invoked occasionally during Reconstruction to
23 federalize state militias, now resides in the statute that enables the President to
24 federalize the National Guard; see 10 U.S.C. 332 (Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70A
25 Stat. 15; Pub. L. 109–163, div. A, title X, §1057(a)(2), Jan. 6, 2006, 119 Stat.
26 3440). One of the reasons for the rise in significance of the National Guard after
27 Reconstruction was the federal “Posse Comitatus Act” of 1878, which prohibited
28 the direct intervention of the U.S. army into states except in extraordinary
circumstances. After that legislation, the National Guard units were needed not so
much as auxiliaries to the U.S. army as substitutes for them. On the “Posse
Comitatus Act” see Gautham Rao, “The Federal “Posse Comitatus” Doctrine:
Slavery, Compulsion, and Statecraft in Mid-Nineteenth-Century America,” *Law
and History Review*, 26 (Spring, 2008), 1–56.

1 during Reconstruction by the U.S. army, the state militias, and other legitimate,
2 pro-Union law enforcement officials.

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4 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

5 Executed on January 6, 2023 at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

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
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Michael Vorenberg

EXHIBIT A

CURRICULUM VITAE

Michael Vorenberg
Associate Professor of History
Brown University

Education Ph.D. in History, Harvard University, November 1995 (American History)
A.M. in History, Harvard University, March 1990 (American History)
A.B. in History, Harvard University, June 1986, *summa cum laude* (Ancient History)

Professional Appointments

Associate Professor of History (with tenure), Brown University, 2004-
Vartan Gregorian Assistant Professor, Brown University, 2002-2004
Assistant Professor, History Department, Brown University, 1999-
Assistant Professor, History Department, SUNY at Buffalo, 1996-99
Post-Doctoral Fellow, W.E.B. Du Bois Center, Harvard University, 1995-96
Lecturer, History and Literature Program, Harvard University, 1995-96

Scholarship

Books

Lincoln's Peace: The Elusive End of the American Civil War (forthcoming with Alfred A. Knopf).
The Emancipation Proclamation: A Brief History with Documents (Bedford/St. Martin's, 2010).
Final Freedom: The Civil War, the Abolition of Slavery, and the Thirteenth Amendment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. (Paperback edition, 2004.)

Chapters in Books

“The 1866 Civil Rights Act and the Beginning of Military Reconstruction,” in Christian Samito, ed., *The Greatest and the Grandest Act: The Civil Rights Act of 1866 from Reconstruction to Today* (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 2018), 60-88.
“The Thirteenth Amendment,” in *1865: America Makes War and Peace in Lincoln's Final Year* (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 2015), 7-21.
“Liberté, Égalité, and Lincoln: French Readings of an American President,” in Richard Carwardine and Jay Sexton, eds., *The Global Lincoln* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 95-106.
“Citizenship and the Thirteenth Amendment: Understanding the Deafening Silence,” in Alexander Tsesis, ed., *The Promises of Liberty: The History and Contemporary Relevance of the Thirteenth Amendment* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).

“Did Emancipation Create American Citizens?: Abraham Lincoln’s View” (in Russian), in Victoria Zhuravleva, ed., *Abraham Lincoln: Lessons of History and the Contemporary World* (Moscow: Russian State University for the Humanities Press, 2010).

“Abraham Lincoln’s ‘Fellow Citizens’—Before and After Emancipation,” in William A. Blair and Karen Fisher Younger, eds., *Lincoln’s Proclamation: Emancipation Reconsidered* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 151-169.

“The Thirteenth Amendment Enacted,” in Harold Holzer and Sara Vaughn Gabbard, eds., *Lincoln and Freedom: Slavery, Emancipation, and The Thirteenth Amendment* (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 2007).

“After Emancipation: Abraham Lincoln’s Black Dream,” in John Y. Simon, Harold Holzer, and Dawn Vogel, eds., *Lincoln Revisited* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2007).

“Slavery Reparations in Theory and Practice: Lincoln’s Approach,” in Brian Dirck, ed., *Lincoln Emancipated: The President and the Politics of Race* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois Univ. Press, 2007).

“Reconstruction as a Constitutional Crisis,” in Thomas J. Brown, ed., *Reconstructions: New Directions in the History of Postbellum America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

“The World Will Forever Applaud: Emancipation,” in Aaron Sheehan-Dean, ed., *The Struggle for a Vast Future: The American Civil War* (Oxford, UK: Osprey, 2006).

“Emancipating the Constitution: Francis Lieber and the Theory of Amendment,” in Charles R. Mack and Henry H. Lesesne, eds., *Francis Lieber and the Culture of the Mind* (Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina Press, 2005).

“The Chase Court (1864-1873): Cautious Reconstruction,” in Christopher Tomlins, ed., *The United States Supreme Court: The Pursuit of Justice* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2005).

“Bringing the Constitution Back In: Amendment, Innovation, and Popular Democracy during the Civil War Era,” in Meg Jacobs, William Novak, and Julian Zelizer, eds., *The Democratic Experiment: The Promise of American Political History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).

“The King’s Cure: Abraham Lincoln and the End of Slavery,” in Charles Hubbard, ed., *Lincoln Reshapes the Presidency* (Mercer, Penn.: Mercer Univ. Press, 2004).

“Rutherford B. Hayes,” in Alan Brinkley and Davis Dyer, eds., *The Reader’s Companion to the American Presidency*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000.

“Abraham Lincoln and the Politics of Black Colonization,” in Thomas F. Schwartz, ed., “*For a Vast Future Also*”: Essays from the Journal of the Abraham Lincoln Association. New York: Fordham University Press, 1999. (Reprint of article listed below.)

Refereed Journal Articles

“Spielberg’s *Lincoln*: The Great Emancipator Returns,” *Journal of the Civil War Era*, 3 (December 2013), 549-72.

“Imagining a Different Reconstruction Constitution,” *Civil War History*, 51 (December 2005), 416-26.

“‘The Deformed Child’: Slavery and the Election of 1864.” *Civil War History*, 47 (September 2001), 240-257.

“Abraham Lincoln and the Politics of Black Colonization.” *Journal of the Abraham Lincoln Association*, 14 (Summer 1993): 23-46.

Non-Refereed Journal Articles

“Emancipation—Then What?,” *New York Times*, “Disunion” Blog, January 15, 2013, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/15/emancipation-then-what/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0

“Hearts of Blackness: Reconsidering the Abolitionists—Again,” *Reviews in American History*, 32 (March 2004), 33-40.

“The Battle Over Gettysburg: What Lincoln Would Have Said about September 11, 2001.” *Brown Alumni Magazine*, 103 (Jan./Feb. 2003), 27.

“Recovered Memory of the Civil War,” *Reviews in American History*, 29 (Dec. 2001), 550-58.

Invited Lectures

“A Righteous Peace: Abraham Lincoln, the Civil War, and the End of Slavery,” The Humanities Forum, Providence College, Oct. 18, 2019.

“How Wars End--or Don’t: The Civil War as a Case Study,” Henry E. Huntington Society of Fellows Lecture, May 8, 2019.

“Lincoln’s Peace: The Struggle to End the American Civil War,” Occidental College (Billington Lecture), Feb. 21, 2019.

“The Fate of Slavery after Emancipation,” The Great Lectures Series (as OAH Distinguished Lecturer), New York City, October 14, 2017.

“Abraham Lincoln, the Thirteenth Amendment, and the Struggle for American Peace and Freedom,” University of Saint Mary Annual Lincoln Lecture, Topeka, Kansas, February 20, 2017.

“The 14th Amendment as an Act of War,” Boston College, Clough Center, Newton, Massachusetts, September 20, 2016.

“Born in the USA—So What?” Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Constitution Day University Speaker, Worcester, Massachusetts, September 19, 2016.

“The Slave Power on the Gallows: The Deeper Meaning of the Execution of Henry Wirz, Confederate Commandant,” University of California, Berkeley, Legal History Workshop, March 29, 2016.

Salmon P. Chase Symposium on the Thirteenth Amendment (participant), Georgetown Law Center, Dec. 4-5, 2015, Washington, DC.

“The Last Surrender: Looking for the End of the Civil War,” presented at The Lincoln Forum, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, November 17, 2015.

“Voting Rights and the Meaning of Freedom: The View from the Civil War Era,” Annual Lincoln Legacy Lecture, University of Illinois at Springfield, October 15, 2015.

“Final Freedom: The Civil War, the Abolition of Slavery, and the Thirteenth Amendment,” Roger Williams University, October 6, 2015.

“Lincoln and the Jews, Freedom and Discrimination,” Brown Hillel Alumni Association, New York City, May 17, 2015.

“When Should History Say That Slavery Ended in the United States?,” Center for Slavery and Justice, Brown University, May 8th, 2015.

“Lincoln, the Constitution, and the Civil War,” Community College of Rhode Island, April 29, 2015.

“Judgment at Washington: Henry Wirz, Lew Wallace, and the End of the Civil War,” Annual Symposium of Capitol Historical Society, Washington, DC, May 2, 2014.

“Emancipation, Lincoln, and the Thirteenth Amendment,” Dole Forum, Dole Institute of Politics, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, November 21, 2013.

“Spielberg’s Lincoln and the Relation between Film and History,” Department of History, Loyola University, Chicago, Illinois, November 13, 2013.

“The Appomattox Effect: Struggling to Find the End of the American Civil War,” Newberry Library Colloquium, Chicago, Illinois, November 6, 2013.

“Reconstruction and the Origins of Civil Rights,” National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Institute on Civil Rights History, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, July 1, 2013.

“The Origins and Process of Emancipation,” Emancipation at 150 Symposium, Boston College Clough Center, Newton, Massachusetts, April 23, 2013.

“Emancipation—Then What? Citizenship?” Emancipation Proclamation Symposium, University of Michigan, October 26, 2012.

“Blood, Allegiance, Belief: The Meanings of Citizenship in the Civil War Era,” University of Michigan Law School, January 31, 2012.

“American by War: The People and Their Nations during the Civil War,” Phillips Andover Academy, Andover, MA, Nov. 17, 2011.

“Birthright and the Myth of Liberal Citizenship,” JANUS Forum, Brown University, Nov. 15, 2011.

“American by War: The People and Their Nations during the Civil War,” Western Kentucky University, Bowling Green, KY, Oct. 12, 2011.

“The Elections of 1860 and 2010 and the Politics of Citizenship,” Colby College Symposium on the American Civil War Sesquicentennial, Waterville, Maine, November 10, 2010.

“Americans Debate Citizenship—Then and Now,” Brown Club of England, October 12, 2010, London.

“War Powers, *Ex Parte Merryman*, and the Relevance of the American Civil War,” American Bar Association Workshop for High School Teachers, Washington, D.C., June 19, 2010

“Originalism and the Meanings of Freedom,” Georgetown Law School, Washington, D.C., March 30, 2010.

“Abraham Lincoln, Politician,” Rotary Club of Rhode Island, Warwick, R.I., November 6, 2008.

“Lincoln the Citizen,” Abraham Lincoln Symposium, National Archives, Washington, D.C., September 20, 2008.

“Emancipation and its Meaning in Current Scholarship,” National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Institute on “Slavery and Emancipation,” Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, July 28, 2008.

“Lincoln the Citizen—Or Lincoln the Anti-Citizen?,” Abraham Lincoln Symposium, Springfield, Illinois, February 12, 2008.

“The Tangled History of Civil Rights and Citizenship in the Civil War Era,” University of Virginia School of Law, November 2007.

“Civil Liberties and Civil Rights: The Civil War Era,” American Bar Association, Chicago, May 2006.

“Race, the Supreme Court, and the Retreat from Reconstruction,” Boston College School of Law, April 2007.

“Forever Free: The Meanings of Emancipation in Lincoln’s Time and Ours,” St. Louis University, December 7, 2006.

“Slavery Reparations in Historical Context,” Connecticut College, New London, Connecticut, March 2, 2006.

“Abraham Lincoln, The Civil War and the Conflicting Legacies of Emancipation,” presented as part of the “Forever Free” series, Providence Public Library, Providence, R.I., January 26, 2006.

“Abraham Lincoln, War Powers, and the Impact of the Civil War on the U.S. Constitution,” presented at symposium on “War Powers and the Constitution,” Dickinson College, Dickinson, Penn., October 3, 2005.

“Reconsidering Law, the Constitution, and Citizenship,” presented at “New Directions in Reconstruction” symposium, Beaufort, S.C., April 15-18, 2004.

“Abraham Lincoln, Slavery, and Modern Legacies,” Public History Series, University of Las Vegas, Nevada, February 12, 2004.

“Oaths, African Americans, and Citizenship,” University of Nevada at Las Vegas Law School, February 12, 2004.

“Reconsidering the Era of the Oath: African Americans Before Union Military Courts during the American Civil War,” presented to the Law and History symposium, Northwestern University Law School, Chicago, Ill., November 3, 2003.

“Racial and Written Constitutions in Nineteenth-Century America,” presented to the workshop of the Department of History, Boston College, Newton, Massachusetts, March 2003.

“Abraham Lincoln, Abolition, and the Impact of the Civil War on the Cult of the Constitution,” presented at the Social Law Library, Suffolk University, Boston, Massachusetts, February 2002.

“Francis Lieber, Constitutional Amendments, and the Problem of Citizenship,” presented at The Francis Lieber Symposium, University of South Carolina, Columbia, S.C., November 2001.

“How Black Freedom Changed the Constitution,” presented at the “Writing the Civil War” symposium, Atlanta History Center, Atlanta, Georgia, September 2001.

“From a Covenant with Death to a Covenant with Life: The Constitution’s Transformation during the American Civil War,” presented as the Annual Constitutional Anniversary Lecture, National Archives, Washington, D.C., September 2001.

“New Perspectives on Abraham Lincoln, Emancipation, and the Civil War,” presented to the Civil War Round Table of Rhode Island, Cranston, Rhode Island, June 2001.

“Historical Roots of the Modern Civil Rights Movement: The Constitution,” presented at the Civil Rights Summer Institute, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, June 2001.

“Race, Law, and the Invention of the State Action Doctrine in the Late Nineteenth Century,” presented at the Columbia University Law School, New York City, April 2001.

“A King’s Cure, a King’s Style: Lincoln, Leadership, and the Thirteenth Amendment,” presented at the “Abraham Lincoln and the Legacy of the Presidency” conference, Lincoln Memorial University, Harrogate, Tennessee, April 2001.

“The Tangled Tale of Civil War Emancipation,” presented at the University of Richmond, Richmond, Virginia, March 2001.

“The King’s Cure: Abraham Lincoln, the Thirteenth Amendment, and the Fate of Slavery,” presented at the Abraham Lincoln Institute of the Mid-Atlantic, Washington, D.C., March 2001.

“Race, the Supreme Court, and the Retreat from Reconstruction,” presented at the Boston College School of Law, Newton, Mass., April 2000.

Papers Read or Discussed

“Prisoners of Freedom, Prisoners of War: An Untold Story of Black Incarceration--And How it Might be Told,” Brown Legal History Workshop, Oct. 28, 2019.

“Bearer of a Cup of Mercy: Lew Wallace’s American Empire,” Henry E. Huntington Library, Research Fellows Meeting, Feb. 6, 2019.

“Anti-Imperialism and the Elusive End of the American Civil War,” presented at the “Remaking North American Sovereignty” Conference, Banff, Alberta, Canada, July 31, 2015.

“The Election of 1864: Emancipation Promised, Emancipation Deferred,” presented at The Annual Meeting of the Organization of American Historians, Atlanta, Georgia, April 11, 2014.

“The Appomattox Effect: Struggling to Find the End of the American Civil War,” Department of History, Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill., Nov. 15, 2013.

“Birth, Blood, and Belief: Allegiance and the American Civil War,” presented at the Elizabeth Clark Legal History Workshop Series, Boston University School of Law, Nov. 16, 2011.

“French Readings of Lincoln’s Role in the Creation of American Citizenship,” presented at the conference on European Readings of Abraham Lincoln, His Times and Legacy, American University of Paris, Paris, France, October 18, 2009.

“Was Lincoln’s Constitution Color-Blind?,” presented at the Abraham Lincoln Bicentennial Symposium, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., April 24, 2009.

“Citizenship and the Thirteenth Amendment: Understanding the Deafening Silence,” presented at conference on Slavery, Abolition, and Human Rights: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Thirteenth Amendment, April 17, 2009

“Did Emancipation Create American Citizens?—Abraham Lincoln’s View,” presented at the conference on Abraham Lincoln: Issues of Democracy and Unity, Russian State University, Moscow, Feb. 8, 2009.

“The Racial and Written Constitutions of Nineteenth-Century America,” Cogut Center for the Humanities, Brown University, Nov. 4, 2008.

“Civil War Era State-Building: The Human Cost,” Boston University Political History Workshop, March 19, 2008.

“Citizenship and the Thirteenth Amendment: Understanding the Deafening Silence,” annual meeting of the *Law and Society Association*, Montreal, May 30, 2008.

“Claiming Citizenship: Black and White Southerners Make Their Cases During the Civil War,” presented at the annual meeting of the *Southern Historical Association*, Memphis, November 2004.

“Imagining a Different Reconstruction Constitution,” presented at the annual meeting of the Social Science History Association, Baltimore, November 2003.

“West of Reconstruction: Resolving Mexican-American Property and Citizenship in the Civil War Era,” presented at the annual meeting of the *American Historical Association*, San Francisco, California, January 2002.

“The Limits of Free Soil: The Resolution of Mexican Land Claims during the American Civil War,” presented at the annual meeting of the *Organization of American Historians*, St. Louis, Missouri, April 2000.

“Written Constitutions, Racial Constitutions, and Constitutional Permanence in Nineteenth-Century America,” presented at the annual meeting of the *American Society for Legal History*, Toronto, Ontario, October 1999.

“Law, Politics, and the Making of California Free Soil during the American Civil War,” presented at the annual meeting of the *Western History Association*, Portland, Oregon, October 1999.

“Land Law in the Era of Free Soil: The Case of New Almaden,” *American Society for Environmental History*, Tucson, Arizona, April 1999.

“Written Constitutions, Racial Constitutions, and Constitutional Permanence in Antebellum America,” presented at the annual meeting of the *Society for Historians of the Early American Republic*, Harpers Ferry, W.V., July 1998.

“The Constitution in African-American Culture: Freedom Celebrations and the Thirteenth Amendment,” presented to the *W.E.B. Du Bois Institute*, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, April 1996.

“Civil War Emancipation and the Sources of Constitutional Freedom,” presented at the annual meeting of the *Organization of American Historians*, Washington, D.C., April 1995.

“The Origins and Original Meanings of the Thirteenth Amendment,” presented at the annual meeting of the *American Society for Legal History*, Washington, D.C., October 1994.

“Civil War Emancipation in Theory and Practice: Debates on Slavery and Race in the Border States, 1862-1865,” presented at the *Southern Labor Studies Conference*, Birmingham, Alabama, October 1993.

Service

University

Anna S. K. Brown Library advisory committee, member, 2016-present.
Co-Organizer (with Faiz Ahmed, Rebecca Nedostup, Emily Owens), Brown Legal History Workshop, 2015-present.
Political Theory Project, Advisory Board, 2010-2019
Organizer and Presenter, “Abraham Lincoln for the 21st Century: A Symposium honoring the Abraham Lincoln Bicentennial,” John Hay Library, Brown University, Feb. 27-28, 2009. Plenary lecture by Benjamin Jealous, president of NAACP, and six symposium participants. Funding secured from Rhode Island Foundation, Rhode Island Lincoln Bicentennial Commission, Brown Provost, Brown Dean of Faculty, History Department, Africana Studies Department

Profession

Program Committee, Society of Civil War Historians, 2022 annual conference, 2020-present.
Cromwell Prize Committee, American Society for Legal Historians, 2014-2017.
Board of Editors, *Law and History Review*, 2004-2013 (reappointed 2009).
Advisory Committee, United States Abraham Lincoln Bicentennial Commission, 2002-10.
Board of Advisors, Lincoln Prize, Gettysburg Institute (2000-present).
Co-Chair, Local Arrangements Committee, Annual Meeting of the Society for Historians of the Early American Republic, Providence, Rhode Island, Summer 2004.
Referee for National Endowment for the Humanities
Scholarly Editions, 2002; Summer Grants, 2001-2003.
Committee Member, Local Arrangements Committee, Annual Meeting of the American Society for Environmental History, to be held in Providence, Rhode Island, Spring 2003.
Referee for article manuscripts submitted to the *Journal of American History*, *Law and History Review*, *Law and Social Inquiry*, *Journal of the Civil War Era*, and *Civil War History*.
Referee for book manuscripts submitted to Houghton Mifflin, Harvard University Press, Oxford University Press, New York University Press, University of Chicago Press, University of Illinois Press, and University of North Carolina Press.
Advisory Editor for *Proteus* (special issue devoted to the American Civil War, Fall 2000).

Community

Lecture on American Citizenship and Exclusion, Center for Reconciliation, Providence, R.I., July 2018.

Instructor in co-taught course at the Rhode Island Adult Correctional Institute (ACI) through the Brown University BELLS program, 2013.

Lecture on Reconstruction-Era Constitutional Amendments, Barrington, RI, Open Classroom, April 4, 2013.

Lecture on 150th Anniversary of the Emancipation Proclamation, Wheeler School, Providence, Rhode Island, January 17, 2013.

Rhode Island Civil War Sesquicentennial Commission, 2011- .

Rhode Island Abraham Lincoln Bicentennial Commission (appointed by Governor), 2005-2009.

Lecturer on the Brown Steering Committee on Slavery and Justice, The Wheeler School, Providence, Rhode Island, November 2006.

Seminar leader for National Endowment for the Humanities “We the People” initiative at Deerfield Historical Society, Deerfield, Mass., April 2006.

Seminar leader for National Endowment for the Humanities “Teaching American History” initiative at Rhode Island Historical Society, Providence, R.I., September 2005.

Seminar leader for National Endowment for the Humanities “We the People” initiative at Deerfield Historical Society, Deerfield, Mass., March 2005.

Advisor to the Burrillville, Rhode Island, School Department, on securing and administering a “Teaching American History” grant from the United States Department of Education, 2001-2002.

Academic Honors and Fellowships

Ray Allen Billington Professor, Occidental College/Henry E. Huntington Library, 2018-19.

Pembroke Center for the Study of Women and Gender Fellowship, Brown University, 2016-17.

National Endowment for the Humanities Long-Term Fellowship, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, Massachusetts, 2014.

National Endowment for the Humanities Long-Term Fellowship, Newberry Library, Chicago, Illinois, 2013.

Finalist, CIES Fulbright Fellowship for University of Rome III (2010-11 competition) Cogut Center for the Humanities Fellowship, Brown University, Fall 2008.

William McLoughlin Prize for Teaching in the Social Sciences, Brown University, 2007.

Karen Romer Prize for Undergraduate Advising, Brown University, 2007.

History News Network (HNN) “Top Young Historian,” 2005 (1 of 12 named in the U.S.).

Vartan Gregorian Assistant Professorship, Brown University, 2002-2004.

Finalist, Lincoln Prize, 2002 (for *Final Freedom*).

American Council of Learned Societies/Andrew W. Mellon Fellowship, 2002-03.

Kate B. and Hall J. Peterson Fellowship, American Antiquarian Society, 2002-03.

Salomon Research Award, Brown University, 2002-2003.

National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Stipend, 2001.

Julian Park Fund Fellowship, SUNY at Buffalo, 1998.

Research Development Fund Fellowship, SUNY at Buffalo, 1997.
Harold K. Gross Prize for Best Dissertation at Harvard in History, 1996.
Delancey Jay Prize for Best Dissertation at Harvard on Human Liberties, 1996.
W.E.B. Du Bois Fellowship, Harvard University, 1995.
Whiting Fellowship in the Humanities, 1994.
Bowdoin Prize for Best Essay at Harvard in the Humanities, 1993.
Indiana Historical Society Graduate Fellowship, 1993.
W. M. Keck Fellowship, Henry E. Huntington Library, 1993.
Everett M. Dirksen Congressional Research Fellowship, 1993.
Mark DeWolfe Howe Fellowship, Harvard Law School, 1993.
Charles Warren Center Research Fellowship, Harvard History Dept., 1991-2.
Derek Bok Award for Distinction in Teaching at Harvard, 1991.
Philip Washburn Prize for Best Senior Thesis at Harvard in History, 1986.